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In this thesis in social philosophy, I investigate mechanisms of Foucauldian power that can 
lead to social exclusion, ostracism and violence. The fundamental idea is that the way we 
construct societies in the modern era tends to exclude certain individuals who are perceived 
not to fit in to the society’s basic project. According to Foucault, we are constituted as 
individuals in and through power, which is to say that we stand in various kinds of strategic 
relations to each other as persons and as members of social groups. There is then a correlation 
between the way we perceive the world and how we are socialized into social networks. This 
is an important aspect of the dynamics of exclusion. There are various ways to exclude, which 
has much to do with status and stigmatization, and in my thesis I will focus on four of them, 
that are in some ways interrelated. These are racism, classism, sexism and homophobia. In the 
thesis, I will look at how these social problems can be explained by social hierarchies of 
power and status, and how the problems can shed light on the nature of such hierarchies. My 
hope is that such understanding can reduce the likelihood of violent exclusion and make it 
easier for us to inter-act together in the face of individual differences. 
 
Sammendrag 
I denne masteroppgaven i sosial filosofi undersøker jeg hvordan mekanismer som er særegne 
for Foucaults maktbegrep kan føre til sosial eksklusjon, utfrysning og vold. Den grunnlegg-
ende tanken bak undersøkelsen er at måten vi skaper samfunn på i moderne tid har en tendens 
til å ekskludere enkelte individer som oppfattes ikke å passe inn i samfunnets basale prosjekt. 
Ifølge Foucault konstitueres vi som individer i og gjennom makt, hvilket innebærer at vi står i 
forskjellige slags strategiske relasjoner overfor hverandre, som personer og som medlemmer 
av sosiale grupper. Det finnes altså en sammenheng mellom måten vi forstår verden på og 
hvordan vi sosialiseres inn i forskjellige sosiale nettverk. Dette påvirker igjen ekskluderingens 
dynamikk. Det finnes ulike måter å ekskludere på, hvor status og stigmatisering inngår som 
fellesnevnere. Jeg vil her sette søkelys på fire slike former for eksklusjon, som jeg vil hevde 
er gjensidig relaterte. Eksklusjonsformene jeg vil skrive om er rasisme, klasseforakt, sexisme 
og homofobi. I oppgaven vil jeg se på hvordan disse problemene kan forstås i lys av sosiale 
hierarkier av makt og status, og hvordan problemene kan bidra til å forstå slike hierarkiers 
vesen. I beste fall kan slik forståelse redusere faren for voldelig eksklusjon og gjøre det enkle-
re for oss å fungere sammen, hvor forskjellige vi enn måtte være.    
1. Introduction 
 
Human beings relate to each other in various ways, guided by our cultures and various 
norms that help us regulate our interactions, such that we may interact together constructively 
and harmoniously. To what extent our behaviour should be guided by strict rules and norms 
may be a matter of some dispute, itself probably driven by fundamental norms and values. 
The degree of freedom we have in our interpersonal affairs is not a simple question either, but 
depends largely on what we mean by freedom and the preferences we have, which are also to 
a large extent culturally determined. In any case, we are guided by such underlying codes, 
norms and values and these factors help determine who we are as social beings and even as 
persons. The French philosopher Michel Foucault used the term "dispositif" to indicate these 
heterogeneous mechanisms of “producing” and “developing” human beings into subjects in 
the power's process of social body. This thesis will be about the nature and development of 
such dispositifs with an eye on a specific theme.  
How does it come about that the way we think and perceive the world, the way we be-
have and regulate our communities, may lead to the exclusion and hatred of various groups of 
human beings? In this thesis, I will argue that this has much to do with how we construe pers-
onhood, and that it has much to do with power. This is power in a Foucauldian sense, meant 
as a sort of social field that runs through individuals. One is always within power, and within 
the boundaries of power various forces may stand in strategic relations to each other. When a 
phenomenon of whatever kind has the potential to influence the relative position of different 
dispositifs, I will call it a strategic vector. This is then a word meant to entail a function. The 
goal of the thesis is to show how human beings come to be excluded from societies where 
they should feel at home and be included. I will try to understand and communicate how the 
process of forming a community creates hierarchies of power and status («economies of merit 
and fault», as Foucault put it) that stigmatize and exclude certain groups of individuals. I will 
focus on racism, classism, sexism and homophobia and show how these problems can shed 
light on human hierarchies and how the mechanisms proper to such hierarchies can shed light 
on the aforementioned problems.   
Hatred and exclusion are social and cultural phenomena, so even though the thesis is 
on social philosophy, I will make use of work made in fields other than philosophy. I will 
make rather liberal use of social sciences such as anthropology and sociology, and I will use 
gender theory and postcolonial theory to explore the mechanisms of sexism, racism and 
homophobia. I will make use of the works of various social theorists, but most of the anthro-
pology I use in my thesis will be gathered from Mary Douglas, who, in her classic work 
Purity and Danger, presents a framework of order and social contagion that is eminently 
suitable to my project. 
The thesis will follow this trajectory: First, I will present a case study from Chechnya, 
Russia, which sparked my interest in the topic of this thesis. The persecution of suspected 
homosexuals is a contemporary atrocity, and I find it important to understand why things like 
that can happen. This chapter will function as an entrance to the thesis proper, and is followed 
by a chapter on theory. Here, I will start with an introduction of Fourcault, the philosopher on 
whom I will base the basic framework of my thesis. Other authors I will introduce here are 
Douglas, Bataille, Agamben and Nietzsche. These are all thinkers whose work I will read 
along with the fundamentally Foucauldian framework in order to explore the nature of group 
formation and the ways such common projects can lead to exclusion and stigmatization. 
After these introductory chapters, I will explore the nature of nationalism. This will be 
the foundation of my critique of the group and social belonging that go prior to exclusion 
from the group, as well as social hierarchies proper to social formations. The nation is a pro-
ject that has significant moral and epistemic aspects to it, which have explanatory value for 
the creation and maintenance of in- and outgroups. Following that chapter, I will look at the 
mechanisms of social capital, focusing on racism and classism and the way these forms of 
stigmatization follow from social power within the context of neo-liberalism.  
Following that, I will start exploring the colony, as the counter-topos to the national 
project of the imperialist state. The colony is a place where imperial powers enforce their self-
apponited mission of civilization, and thus a topic that is suitable to a critique of the univers-
alizing ambitions of the modern state. This chapter is followed by a look at political processes 
pertaining to two different regimes, where the main goal is to describe the interplay between 
major discourses and counterdiscourses, focusing especially on the perils and promises of the 
counterdiscourse. This chapter is followed by another chapter about social contagion. 
After these chapters, I will look at social paranoia and normalization, focusing on 
homophobia and the economy of gender. This is followed by an in-depth exploration of gen-
der dynamics and sexism, and how such mechanisms play into the national project, as well as 
interactions with other sorts of social hierarchy. After these two chapters, I will explore how 
well-intended projects of liberation can backfire and lead to other sorts of unfreedom, as well 
as stigmatization of relevant groups who become demonized as the great enemies of goodness 
and civilization. This is a critique of universalizing discourses in general and the correspond-
ing blindness to local specificities of power and community. This is an aspect of discursivity 
that can lead to stigmatization and exclusion. Then follows the conclusion.  
To begin all this, I will present a brief overview the situation in Chechnya that provok-
ed me to explore the nature of stigmatization and social exclusion. Chechnya may be an esp-
ecially relevant case for my topic, because the republic has been subject to imperial policies 
and oppression from the larger Russian state. There have therefore been grounds for political 
paranoia long before the current persecution. In my opinion, a study of the powers at work in 
Chechnya has explanatory value for the mechanisms of stigmatization and social exclusion in 
general. There is a vicious sort of agency at work in Chechnya, particularly in the police and 
the political class, but it depends on social processes with mechanisms that are relevant be-
yond the boundaries of this relatively small republic.       
 
2. Enter the Dungeon 
 
On July 9th, 2017, the internet edition of the newspaper Novaya Gazeta presented an 
awful news item from the Russian republic of Chechnya. Tens of people had become victims 
of extrajudicial executions, murdered because they were suspected of homosexual leanings. 
At the same time, the same newspaper had gathered eyewitness accounts of secret prisons in 
Chechnya where people had been tortured for the same reason. 27 of the murdered persons’ 
names were published in this July issue, and the journalist Yelena Milashina could inform us 
that the list was not complete1. 
 When I first read this story, I was angry and disgusted by the fact that something like 
this could happen in our contemporary world. After two world wars, a long and tragic history 
of pointless violence and ethnic cleansing and far too many lives lost because of scrambles for 
power, land and resources we were supposed to have learned something. «Never again» has 
been uttered ad nauseam by record keepers of brutal events, and yet here, in one of the count-
 
1 Milashina, Yelena: «Это была казнь. В ночь на 26 января в Грозном расстреляли десятки людей». In: 
Novya Gazeta. July 9th, 2017 
ries most ravaged by the onslaught of the Nazi Reich, a devilry of the same kind was brewing. 
Human lives were being extinguished for no good reason, and the only people who seemed to 
be in a position to stop this thing from happening were not only not intervening. They were 
accomplices to the violence.  
The present de facto dictator in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has publicly proclaimed 
many times that «there are no gay people in Chechnya», and Russia’s LGBT Network, led by 
Igor Kotchetkov, once published a screenshot where Kadyrov urged people to take part in 
«gay hunting». This is a bloody «sport» that seems to have many adherents among activists 
on Russia’s far right, as witnessed by the recent murder of Yelena Grigoriyeva in St. Peters-
burg. The Network is a reliable source of information about the situation for LGBT people in 
Russia, and has saved a lot of lives by setting up a telephone hotline and helping people flee 
from Chechnya and Russia. 
The cuurent situation for LGBT people in Russia is a tragedy that deserves our attenti-
on, and which I have been following rather closely for some time. It is not, however, historic-
ally unprecedented. Even in our present time people are persecuted for apparently arbitrary 
factors such as their sexual orientation and skin colour. Examples of this are far too easy to 
find. The Nazi persecution of Jews, Roma, gay people and mentally handicapped persons has 
a special place in the history of political violence, but today we see brutal repression against 
the Oromo in Ethiopia, Palestinians in areas occupied by Israel, and Kashmiri people victim-
ized by the Indian government, to name but a few cases. In Norway, a fascist madman murd-
ered 69 people at a summer camp for young politicians because he disagreed with them on 
immigration. 
In Europe we see escalating xenophobia and homophobia. Far right parties in many 
countries have been on the rise for some time, adding to rising tensions. In such a context, a 
couple of questions must be asked if we are to have any hope of stopping and averting the 
violence. One of these questions is historical: What is the background for the current hatred? 
What is its origin and the nature of its historical development? Building on these questions, 
some political questions must be investigated, such as the role of the economy in the rise of 
the far right, and what cohorts in society are most likely to support rising xenophobic tenden-
cies and even violence against people whom they consider to be superfluous or unworthy. 
Asking such questions, and finding good answers to them, is necessary in the effort to curb 
undesirable tendencies, and it is a necessary aid in the effort to probe into a more fundamental 
philosophical question: What kinds of social mechanisms lead to hatred and exclusion?  
In the present thesis I shall assume that hatred is a feeling created in a subject through 
the subject’s personality in conjunction with various forces that are perceived to be threaten-
ing to the subject’s identity and values. Subjects are constituted in and through power, and the 
processes of subject formation give rise to various desires and aversions. The processes of 
subject formation depend on habituation, which also leads to different ways of interpreting the 
world. The way communities are constructed, and the way we are constituted as persons are 
conducive to the development of various prejudices. As persons we have a need for identities 
that give meaning to a life, and thereby a sort of anchorage point in one’s existence (or with 
Heidegger: Being-in-the-World). A real or imagined threat to one’s identity, and thus one’s 
sense of meaning, value and direction, can make us want to get rid of the present threat, be 
that a discourse, an object or a human being. 
It seems that modernity as such is far from providing a guarantee against violent kinds 
of exclusion. Indeed, the Jewish philosopher Zygmunt Bauman posited that the Holocaust was 
a product of the dark side of modernity itself. Civilizing powers have constructed an efficient 
social machinery where science, art and philosophy could flourish in a community built for 
the common good. Then one must ask how this common good is defined. For this machinery, 
while it provides quite wonderful human services, is fueled by slavery and death camps. If 
that is the case, then we must ask how social organization can contribute to processes that lead 
to extermination. One sees, when one reads Bauman, a scepticism to instrumental reason. A 
«scientific» attitude can be quite useful when one wants to develop fields of inquiry and struc-
tures of production, but the necessarily narrow focus pertaining to such projects always leaves 
something out. These unknown factors can be experienced as irritating anomalies, noise in a 
perfect process. Such anomalies can appear difficult to assimilate and may be problematic for 
an otherwise smooth operation. Principles that have worked fine up to this point no longer 
apply. In a social system, these are Strangers who challenge our ways of doing things, our 
political projects. Normally, these people are not murdered, but when the stars are perfectly 
aligned around a bad moon, history has shown that this can happen.    
A somewhat fresher news item from Chechnya than the one previously mentioned 
seems to suggest that questions of hatred and violence are tightly connected to the nature of 
power. On July 23rd, 2019, a news item from Novaya Gazeta informed the paper’s readers 
that 27 Chechens had been found dead as a result of a series of extrajudicial executions. They 
were suspected of being members of an underground oppositionist group. According to the 
article, the victims of these executions were arrested in early 2017, that is very close to the 
time when the victims of the Chechen «gay hunt» were found2.  
The coincidence of time and place between the case of the murdered suspected homo-
sexuals and the executed suspected members of an underground oppositionist movement, and 
the apparent connections between these two cases and the local government of Chechnya, 
seems to reveal something about the nature of Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya. It clearly tells us 
that the regime in the Russian republic is a terror regime, not much troubled by the use of 
extreme violence against its own citizens. That is not all, however. The desire to get rid of 
political opponents coincides with the desire to get rid of persons whose personal identities do 
not conform to the government’s standards of conduct in such a way that the common under-
lying desire for control comes rather clearly into view. The will to use violence against pers-
ons who do not conform to certain standards, as innocent as such deviations may be, coincides 
with a desire to keep and maintain political power and control. It seems likely that this desire 
will be particularly acute in times of crisis. In the course of this thesis, I will discuss what I, 
following the lead of Michel Foucault, will call counterdiscourses. These are challenges to a 
dominant way of thinking, which is the main (or «Jupiterian») discourse of that society. 
Especially in times of crisis, people who are perceived as representatives of such counter-
discourses are vulnerable to ostracism, and even persecution. We also see a connection be-
tween the rhetorics of civilizatory progress or regress and the presumed qualities of people 
belonging to a designated «race». 
 «Race», as I use the word in this thesis, is not the same as skin colour. Skin colour is 
an objective factor pertaining to the amount of melanin in a persons’s skin. «Race» is the set 
of connotations pertaining to a certain skin colour. It is important to be clear about this diffe-
rence from the beginning, as I will use the word «race» several times, without in any way en-
dorsing any of the theories about different biological human races, which is dangerous bunk 
science. The idea of races seems to be connected to ideas of genetic purity, therefore one 
would expect racism and sexism to share some common features. 
The central place of sexuality in ensuring the continuation of the race, as well as a 
tight connection between corporal and genetic factors and moral value are apparent in the cur-
rent Chechen witch hunt on homosexuals and in the Nazi anti-semitism that led to one of 
 
2 Milashina, Yelena: «Подвал имени Кадырова; Новые подробности массовой внесудебной казни 27 
жителей Чечни. Расследование Елены Милашиной». In: Novya Gazeta. July 23rd, 2019  
world history’s greatest atrocities, the Holocaust. A perceived need for control and dominat-
ion are also present in both cases. These are extraordinary cases in a history of class struggle, 
ethnic tensions and everyday racism and homophobia, but the hatred and brutality leading up 
to them, particularly the idea that some people are more or less worth than others, are danger-
ous forces that are present in more ordinary times as well. There are dynamics of power and 
discourse at work that have the potential to take the shape and form of atrocities. In order to 
prevent large scale violence, it is necessary to analyze elements of power and discourse and 
the dynamics that operate between them. A thinker who provided us with important instru-
ments to do just that, and upon whose work I will base most of my thesis, was the French phi-
losopher Michel Foucault. I will turn to him and his work in the next chapter.     
 
3. Some Thoughts on Theory 
 
This thesis on social philosophy belongs to a theoretical tradition that originally started 
with Friedrich Nietzsche, but whose specific focus is on Michel Foucault. In my opinion, Fou-
cault’s ideas about normativity, governmentality and social power provide extremely valuable 
and important tools for understanding the social mechanisms of exclusion and hatred. Even 
though the basic framework of my thesis will be a Foucauldian one, this is not per se a thesis 
on Foucault, but one that makes use of his theoretical work and conceptual tools in order to 
explore social problems of my own choosing. As this is the way Foucault himself wanted his 
work to be used, I think my work remains faithful to Foucault’s philosophical project. Even 
though this is not a biographical study, I find it suitable to start my thesis with some notes on 
Foucault’s life and work.      
Foucault as an intellectual was something of a paradox. As the son of a distinguished 
surgeon and a student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, he was very much a product of estab-
lishment academia, yet through his work he presented what may be regarded as the most scat-
hing critique of normalizing power and knowledge regimes in modern history. One factor that 
may help explain this apparent paradox is Foucault’s homosexuality, which he had to supp-
ress because of a less than generous culture in the French academic community, aided by a 
law barring people considered to be of «dubious morality» from employment in the service of 
the state3. Another such factor is his short engagement with the French Communist Party 
(PCF). The atmosphere in the PCF was hardly more welcoming to people with Foucault’s in-
clinations than the French academia, additionally Foucault experienced a «spirit of ascetism 
and intellectual self-flagellation» among students trying to be communists that was a staple of 
Communist parties of the Stalinist type, of which the PCF was one4. Relatedly, most of his 
life Foucault was a political, sometimes militant, leftist, still he was born and remained a part 
of a cultural elite, and he was a constant, and sometimes harsh, critic of the Marxist tradition 
which he distrusted because of the totalizing tendencies he perceived in the tradition. 
Self-sencorship, ascetism and the relationship between power and knowledge were all 
to become recurring themes in Foucault’s work The themes were present in Foucault’s first 
book, Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, which Macey describes as the archaeology of a 
silence. A history of limits where the phenomena that a culture rejects come to constitute that 
culture’s Outside5. Thus, we see early on in Foucault’s work the development of conceptual 
tools for understanding such phenomena as rejection and exclusion that in important ways 
come to define a given culture, because the phenomena that are excluded set the limits for the 
culture’s accepted sense of identity. The Outside is related to a sense of taboo, and we can 
also see here a relation between identity and normativity. The mad are characters that must be 
confined, and thus controlled. What Foucault described as «the great confinement», however, 
was not primarily concerned with the insane, but rather with labour and efficiency. In order to 
control labour and ensure efficiency, a police system was established. 
The emergence of the police is discussed by Foucault near the end of his lecture series 
at the Collège de France 1977 – 1978, which is published as a book with the title Security, 
Territory, Population. The police is here presented as one of two major assemblages of polit-
ical technology, the other being the procedures maintaing the balance of Europe6. What char-
acterizes these two assemblages is their deployment in a field of relations of forces. These are 
vectors in a dynamic network of relations in internal competition with each other. The balance 
of Europe and the police seem to be vectors established to maintain a degree of order and 
foreseeableness necessary to maintain this competitive system. 
 
3 Macey, David: The Lives of Michel Foucault, p. 30 
4 Ibid., p. 40-43 
5 Ibid., p. 95 
6 Foucault, Michel: Security, Territory, Population, p. 312 
The meaning of the word «police», according to Foucault, went through an evolution 
from the fifteenth to the end of the eighteenth century7. In the fifteenth and sixteenth century 
«police» implied a form of community or association governed by a public authority, the set 
of actions that direct these communities under public authority, and, thirdly, the result of a 
good government. «Police» in its earlier manifestation, then, can be understood as a sort of 
institution that has the power to control a community for that community’s own good. This is 
comparable to the notion of «pastoral power» discussed in the same series of lectures. From 
the seventeenth century Foucault considers «police» to refer to the set of means by which the 
state’s forces can be increased while simultaneously maintaining the internal order of the 
state. The end of this venture is to serve the happiness of all the state’s citizens as well as the 
state’s «splendor», understood as visible order and manifest force8. In order to achieve this 
end there is a general need of statistics, which is made both possible and necessary by the 
police. This indicates a clear relationship between the police and the Foucauldian concept of 
biopolitics. Statistics is described as the state’s knowledge of itself and of other states9. This 
serves to emphasize the relationship between power and knowledge in Foucault’s thinking. 
Macey points explicitly to this relationship between power and knowledge, or police 
and epistemology, when he writes that this combination ensures that «madness is perceived in 
terms of an ethical condemnation of idleness»10. We have here not only a relation between po-
litical power and epistemology, but a relation between power, epistemology and morality. The 
political order, guarded by the police, entails a certain way of thinking (an epistemic profile, if 
you will), which in turn implies certain norms serving to keep the subjects of the state within 
acceptable boundaries of action and conduct. This brings us closer to a proper Foucauldian 
understanding of hatred, because the strong grounding of society’s norms in the political basis 
for the state, as well as the epistemic profiles of its citizens, makes it plausible that anyone 
who is perceived to break with these norms risks moral condemnation and social exclusion. 
This implies two things, on the metatextual and on the theoretical level.  
One thing is that, as Derrida famously quipped: «il n’ya pas de hors-texte». Every-
thing is context dependent, such that my own work with this thesis, for example, will clearly 
be coloured by my own prejudices, which will probably manifest themselves in various ways 
in what follows. Another point is that morality is never innocent. There is no great and true 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., pp. 313-314 
9 Ibid., p. 315 
10 Macey, David: The Lives of Michel Foucault, p. 98 
Good (in capital letter to denote universal singularity), such that morality must be seen as a 
social product that can be more or less internally coherent, and not some great and final Judge 
that cannot be wrong and must always be obeyed. One’s frames of thinking, one’s references 
and the norms and values that «conduct conduct» are thus, in Foucault’s opinion, always al-
ready within power. This is a point of view that I certainly share with Foucault. This does not 
mean that there are structures of power out there that produce and reproduce human clones 
ready for use, but that we are situated in various strategic relations to each other in what we 
may think of as spheres of power similar to the moral metaphysics we meet in the works of 
Immanuel Kant. Foucault wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kant’s anthropology and was 
clearly influenced by him. His view of morality, however, was probably even closer to the 
Nietzschean one, particularly elaborated in the Genealogy of Morals. It is a well-known fact 
that Foucault was deeply influenced by Nietzsche and it seems fitting here to give a brief 
presentation of Nietzsche’s understanding of morality.    
According to Friedrich Nietzsche, the accepted morality of a given society has its ori-
gin in the more basic relationship between creditor and debtor11. Like Foucault, Nietzsche em-
phasizes a social balance that must be upheld. If harm has been done to someone, the person 
doing the harm must pay back an equivalent to the harm being done. We can consider this a 
part of a social contract and as the basis for a general economy of viciousness and pain. The 
relationship between creditor and debtor serves as a basis for morality, but also for human co-
gnition12. Power, morality and epistemology are thus tightly bound up together in the work of 
both philosophers. Further, Nietzsche claims that phenomena such as guilt, debt and obliga-
tion lead to a habit of measurement. People measure themselves up against each other. This 
seems conducive to social hierarchies, and since the basis for these hierarchies is equivalent to 
the basis for the society’s morality these social hierarchies are morally sanctioned. Nietzsche 
goes even further than this when he says that measurement is a basis for people’s experience 
of themselves as human beings13. Not only have we a morally sanctioned hierarchical strati-
fication between persons in a society, but we have a culture conducive to differential evalu-
ation of personhood itself. A stratified hierarchy of humanity. 
Given that formal law functions equally for all the community’s members, there is 
likely to be a shared basic system where the multifarious dynamics of status and power play 
 
11 Nietzsche, Friedrich: Moralens Genealogi, p. 58 
12 Ibid., p. 65 
13 Ibid., pp. 65-66 
themselves out. As Mary Douglas points out in Purity and Danger, dirt implies system, more 
precisely system characterized by ideas of purity. Dirt is matter out of place in a system of 
ordering and classification14. In the same vein, the misfits and dregs of society are thus char-
acterized only on the basis of a system that denies them their fundamental human dignity and 
worth. Every society creates its own outcasts. 
It should be kept in mind that the hierarchized model of society discussed here is not a 
static model, but one of conflict and different points of view. Nietzsche traces the evaluative 
categories «good» and «bad» back to the dominating classes of society. The term «good» was 
used by the noble, wealthy and powerful to distance themselves from the dregs, who were ex-
pediently characterized as «bad»15. The poor and oppressed, on their account, name their op-
ponents «evil» because they imply harm.16 The fear of these evil people lead to the creation of 
ascetic ideals such as obedience, meekness and patience. These are then different perspectives 
on relations of power within a community, which may lead to different standards of behaviour 
within a broader cultural fellowship.  
The normative evaluation of different groups and group identities are relevant to the 
notion of the «phantasm» that I will gather mostly from Georges Bataille, a philosopher who 
will figure prominently in this thesis. The reason for the focus on Bataille is that his work on 
anthropology and inner experience has influenced later work in philosophical anthropology 
and, also importantly, made a profound impact on Foucault’s academic development. His not-
ion of the phantasm has explanatory value for how different epistemic communities come to 
perceive other groups that these communities situate themselves in relation to. I will expand 
on this early in the chapter on nationalism. His notions of heterogeneity and homogeneity are 
useful for explaining the connections between group identity and hatred. The connection be-
tween group identity and animosity brings us back to Nietzsche.    
In Nietzsche’s setup, what he calls «slave morality» defines a «good» group identity in 
opposition to an «evil» threat from outside the group. In opposition to this slave morality, 
Nietzsche’s «master morality» is characterized by strength, arrogance and a rather brutal cal-
lousness towards those that the masters consider inferior17. On one side we find hatred and on 
the other we find contempt, and these emotions reinforce one another. Profiting on the slave 
 
14 Douglas, Mary: Purity and Danger, p. 36 
15 Nietzsche, Friedrich: Moralens Genealogi, p. 19 
16 Ibid., pp. 38-4 
17 Ibid., pp. 30-31 
morality and the set of values ignited by resentment are the priests, who lead their flock to-
wards purity and decadence18. It may be objected here that the masters’ contempt may contain 
its own sort of hatred, because the chance that people from the oppressed class do not bow to 
the masters’ wishes may imply its own sort of threat towards the masters’ designs. If disvalu-
ed people choose to rebel against people who consider themselves to be of a higher kind this 
may in itself lead to a desire to destroy these rebels. As Mary Douglas reminds us: «Dirt of-
fends against order»19. Members of the oppressed class may further aspire to reach the positi-
on of masters and thus come to identify with, rather than hate, their oppressors, and there may 
be cases of mutual threats on the top of various hierarchies. We must, in short, regard Nietzs-
che’s conflict model as rather more complex than it may seem at first glance. 
The priests’ role in Nietzsche’s book is reminiscent of the phenomenon that Foucault 
describes as «pastoral power». Foucault describes pastoral power as power over a flock, 
which the pastor, or shepherd, has in common with Nietzsche’s priest. There is also a relig-
ious aspect to both roles, as Foucault presents God as the ultimate shepherd and the king as an 
intermediate between God and the king’s subjects. The king is part of a pastoral structure that 
characterizes the relationship between God and men20. Pastoral power is power over a collect-
ive rather than a territory. Foucault speaks of a «multiplicity in movement»21. The god as 
shepherd, in contradistinction to the Greek god, is a mobile god, not confined to a given ter-
ritory. The pastoral god leads the flock towards good pastures.  
The pastoral power is a beneficial power, as the pastor cares for his flock and ensures 
it salvation. In order to safeguard the flock, the shepherd needs to take care of every single 
sheep, which indicates an individualizing feature of pastoral power. The totality and the in-
dividual must be safeguarded simultaneously. The care for the individual may necessitate 
neglecting the entire flock for the salvation of the one sheep22. Logically, however, the im-
portance of the individual implies the nature of its relation to the group. As Mary Douglas 
reminds us, holiness implies wholeness, unity and integrity23. This in turn implies seperation 
and conformity according to class, and subordination to the order of creation. Hence, we can 
start to see the need for individual subjectivation for the sake of the community as well as the 
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individual. For the group to be ensured salvation according to some cosmological ideal it is 
important for each individual participant to function according to this ideal. Hence also, the 
appropriateness of the shepherd and the priestly class in the works of respectively Foucault 
and Nietzsche.    
As becomes apparent from Foucault’s description, the community, or flock, led by the 
shepherd is a community of a political or spiritual kind that is not reducible to a state. What 
matters here is the composition of the flock itself and its salvation or survival. This commun-
ity is not place bound, but is rather characterized by movement towards good pastures. Still, it 
is a unitary fellowship, so even if the state as such is not directly relevant, the nation may be. 
More important than protecting a territory is defending an order. According to Douglas, ideas 
about seperating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as their main fun-
ction to impose system on an inherently untidy experience24. It is clear that such rituals fulfill 
social functions, that they are not restricted to pure hygiene. Imposing such a system may be 
important to vulnerable groups by securing a place for them in their respective communities, 
and it may be important for the powerful by strengthening their positions of privilege. There 
seems to be grounds for a common purpose here that are likely to solidify systems that may or 
may not be unjust. Breaking with such a system comes at a perceived cost even by community 
members who are unfairly disadvantaged by the prevailing status quo.    
Another interesting point is that the safeguarding of the flock necessitates counting the 
sheep, which necessitates statistics when the flock gets big enough. The necessity of statistics 
seems to be a common denominator between the shepherd and the police discussed earlier. In 
fact, Foucault himself places the role of the shepherd between a policeman and a legislator25. 
The shepherd creates the law and sees to it that it is upheld. The responsibilities of the shep-
herd as lawmaker and caretaker include such things as distributing food, directing the flock, 
indicating the right direction and saying how the sheep must mate so as to have good off-
spring26. Hence, a range of administrative practices which regulate society. It is these practic-
es, more than the law as such that will become important in the formation of biopower, which 
one can regard as a political heir to pastoral power.  
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Biopower is described by Foucault as «the right to make live and to let die»27. This 
was a reversal of the right of the old sovereign to make die and let live, and it took the shape 
and form of a multitude of techniques for achieving the subjection of bodies and control of 
populations28. Biopower works on a macro-level through administration of population and on 
a microlevel through the control of individuals’ bodies. The latter is closer to disciplinary po-
wer that is an older form of power and has been particularly thoroughly explored in Discipline 
and Punish. Biopolitics comes later and depends on various administrative apparata, which 
together with normalization constitute the basis for biopolitics. The most important purpose of 
biopolitics is the regulation and administration of populations in order to ensure the well-
being and progress of the whole. 
The sort of pastoral power discussed above, including the regulation of population for 
its own good, was also problematized in an earlier work, called The Will to Knowledge. This 
was the first book in his series about The History of Sexuality, where the concept of biopower 
was mentioned for the first time. Here, Foucault explains that the use of sex was made a mat-
ter of analysis and intervention in the eighteenth century and that this sort of interventionary 
politics provided anchorage points for later varieties of racism29.    
The regulation of sexuality and its concomitant efforts to control the population in 
«useful» ways has a sinister potential, according to Foucault. His example about the simple-
minded farm hand Jouy and the little girl is meant to tell us something about the popular 
imaginary of degeneracy in nineteenth century France. His brainpan was measured, the bone 
structure of his face studied, and ultimately he was shut away for the rest of his life in the 
hospital at Máreville as a pure object of medical study30. Even though there may be grounds 
for moral condemnation of Jouy’s behaviour, he was treated inhumanely. As an object of stu-
dy, Jouy was in a sense removed from the community of persons in his native village, even 
after he was acquitted in court. In this respect his situation is similar to that of the monster that 
Foucault describes in Abnormal.  
The monster is a character outside the law in two senses: The monster is, as such, a 
violation of the laws of society and a violation of the laws of nature. The monster is a liminal 
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figure that combines the impossible and the forbidden31. Further, the monster does not bring 
about a legal response from the law, but provokes either violence, medical care or pity. The 
monster represents the Outside of the established order, which, as we have seen, tends to frig-
hten people, and thus by its very presence provokes responses of confinement or violence. It 
would serve us well here to remember that pity is a subordinating, albeit beneficent attitude 
and certainly an ascetic virtue par excellence. Another thing to keep in mind here is the nature 
of the term «nature». «Nature» must be understood here as a normative concept. In The Will 
to Knowledge, Foucault establishes a link between nature and law, where acts «contrary to 
nature» are defined as an extreme form of acts «against the law».  
The «unnatural» is also a specific dimension in the field of sexuality32. The «unnatur-
al» in this context is the established order of relations given official approval more than it is a 
biological term. There are, however, connections between the scientific order and the norma-
tive order, and Foucault was most certainly aware of this. He makes it particularly explicit in 
his discussion about confessional practices that made use of a scientific framework in order to 
shape identities along the lines of the structures of psychological science. The inner truth of 
the patient became the truth of scientific discourse, hence a sort of Procrustean bed for non-
conforming subjectivities33. Finally, one should be aware that the status of a liminal creature 
not only places the creature outside of the established order, but by representing society’s 
Outside it contributes to setting its boundries and by so doing it helps define the shape and 
structure of society itself. Therefore, it is not only the case that society creates its own out-
casts, but these outcasts are instrumental in defining the societies that exclude them. We will 
return to this mechanism in the discussion of Bataille’s notions of homogeneity and hetero-
geneity in chapter 7.   
The monster is presented as one of three figures in what Foucault calls a «genealogy 
of abnormality», along with the individual to be corrected and the (child) masturbator34. The 
monster is certainly the most spectacular figure here, but these are all important figures of de-
viance who challenge the normative order. Where the monster is a cosmological figure, the 
two other figures are barely noticable in their deviance. The individual to be corrected is dis-
tinguished by his incorrigibility, which calls for particular techniques of training and correc-
tion, whereas the masturbator embodies the universal secret shared by everyone. The mastur-
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bator’s universality turns him into the root of every possible evil. The spheres of power these 
figures challenge, before they merge towards the end of the nineteenth century, are respective-
ly the framework of politico-juridical powers, the family, and the individual’s body. 
Foucault’s ideas about monstrosity and primary exclusion are relevant to the work of 
another theorist to whom I will turn repeatedly in the course of this thesis, namely Giorgio 
Agamben, an Italian philosopher who has frequently been quite explicit about his theoretical 
indebtedness to Foucault. According to Agamben, legal order and the state in the Western 
hemisphere was based on an act of exclusion. The political group is defined by the individuals 
that it chooses to exclude. Agamben posits a hierarchy of humanity inherent to the basic fram-
ework of the modern state, which he insists we must understand as biopolitical. Agamben’s 
theory of law and society contain some interesting moments that will be important for the de-
velopment of the present thesis. His ideas about exceptionality and ambiguous sacredness 
makes him an illuminating and constructive companion to Georges Bataille.     
The religious aspect of pastoral power, as well as the emphasis on the shepherd’s de-
votion to the flock, indicates a strong community of values. For a community like the pastoral 
one to function there has to be, at the outset, a set of values that guides the conduct of the 
shepherd as well as the flock. This seems likely to be conducive to two things: A strengthened 
feeling of community between the members of a given cultural system and conflict between 
opposing systems of this kind. Indeed, Foucault reminds us that a great part of the struggles 
that permeated the Christian world from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century were struggl-
es about pastoral power, all the while keeping the pastorate as a leading force. The struggles 
were about the governance of men, «the regimen of souls» and the right to lay down the law 
for the conduct of everyday life35. Particularly interesting here is that the pastor also has the 
power to expel from the flock «those sheep that by disease or scandal are liable to contamin-
ate the whole flock»36. There is a connection between conduct, contagion and obedience. The 
shepherd and the flock thus enters a system of obedience in which the end point is to reach the 
point of complete subordination. There will be patterns of purity, dirt and contagion here, 
which will be important for logics of inclusion and exclusion. Even the shepherd cannot break 
with this system because it is bestowed on him by God, regarded here as the Leitmotif, or 
highest principle, of the community.37 In this system everyone is, in principle, responsible for 
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everyone else, such that a structure is established in which obedience is assured through pow-
er, investigation, self-examination and examination of others38. This will make a difference 
for consequent normalization and administrative regulation relevant to biopolitics. 
These systems described by Foucault and Nietzsche, in which human beings are 
reduced, and reduce themselves, to puppets for the will of others seem to be fertile grounds 
for dynamic fields of sadomasochistic relations. The dynamics of cultural sadomasochism, as 
elaborated by Lynn S. Chancer, requires a frame of habit based on rather stable relations of 
power and powerlessness. There is an excessive attachment between the dominant and the 
dominated parties and these parties are driven towards their respective roles by repetitive and 
ritualistic structures. As with Foucault, Chancer’s sadomasochistic schema is in constant flux, 
operating on the basis of forces and counterforces. Finally, people in the masochistic position 
(that is, the dominated) face severe consequences if they challenge the power of individuals in 
more dominant positions39. It must, however, be remembered that a sadomasochistic relation-
ship should not be thought of as a «pure» or static relation. The sadistic position depends on 
the submission of the masochistic party. Thus, there will normally be an element of masoc-
hism in the sadist and an element of sadism in the masochist. One might say that the sadist 
and the masochist enter a dialectic relation with clear tendencies on both sides.  
Chancer emphasizes a deepseated need for community that is particularly salient in 
times of solitude and uncertainty. A bit paradoxically, perhaps, the need for moral community 
is stronger in cultures characterized by individualism and competition. In times of normative 
individualism sadomasochism becomes a strategy for coping with the experienced dissolution 
of social bonds40. Nietzsche points out something similar when he says that feelings about 
values express conditions of preservation and growth belonging to times gone by.41 There is a 
need to hold on to patterns of established order that are no longer culturally relevant. The leap 
into modernity necessarily implies a leap into an unknown state of affairs. As Hamlet said, 
such existential uncertainty «puzzles the will and makes us rather bear those ills we have than 
fly to others that we know not of». It will not always be practically possible to make such a 
flight, and so we can probably expect a kind of Hegelian Aufhebung in times of transition that 
is stronger than in more stable times. It also seems likely that such a situation would make one 
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more inclined to support authority figures, which in turn is a sign of an underlying sadomaso-
chistic tendency. Chancer herself seems to lean towards such an interpretation42.  
 
4. Nationalism – The situated Self 
 
As my thesis is about mechanisms of exclusion, the patterns of group formation will 
be important for the basic structure of the present work. Ideas about belonging and social 
boundaries are particularly salient in theories about the nation and nationalism. This is a field 
of study where the problems of community have been discussed in a fruitful and critical way. 
Here, I will in particular make use of Benedict Anderson’s work, whose book Imagined Com-
munities, is regarded as one of the foundational works in the academic study of nationalism.  
The struggle for biopower, the right to administrate populations according to their own 
good, seems simultaneously to be a struggle between ideas, and the ideas governing a given 
society have a strong binding power on its population. Benedict Anderson, in his Imagined 
Communities, points out that the fraternity of nations tends to have a strange power of con-
viction, strong enough for people to willingly die for them43. This is the case even though the 
likelihood that most of the people within these communities have even met each other is re-
markably slight. A central pillar in such a community, Anderson claims, is a shared discourse, 
channeled in Anderson’s example through the morning newspaper44. This paper serves as a 
tangible link to other readers that each individual reader knows nothing about, except that 
there is a rather strong likelihood that they will also consume the same gossip at roughly the 
same point in time.  
The way the news is presented to us gives us a frame of reference for focusing our 
attention. This is relevant to the structure of the phantasm, as the link between image, associ-
ation and external reality can have an effect on our physical conduct in our encounters with 
the external world45. The phantasm combines representations (ideas) with hallucinations and 
produces images that one perceives in the surrounding world46. This concept is very important 
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for the practical function of a stereotype or trope in a social sphere. It helps to explain, for ex-
ample, why dark skin can be associated with savagery or homosexuality can be associated 
with decadence even by subjects who would morally condemn such associations. On the other 
hand, the phantasm also helps to explain how one can summon the spirits of one’s ancestors 
by the aid of a piece of cloth one has chosen to call a «flag». This is less a matter of rational 
deliberation than it is a matter of emotions and drives that are often channeled through stereo-
types, which in turn define the kinds of phantasms that come to influence social behaviour47. 
Thus, rational thinking interacts continually with pre- and pararational dynamics to influence 
behaviour and normativity. I believe it is constructive to consider the phantasms in light of 
power relations along the line of Foucault’s power/knowledge axis. The emotional content 
attached to norms and shared world views contribute to a large extent with establishing bonds 
of community between people who share a social world and norms that regulate behaviour. A 
common pool of similar world views is important for the creation of a nation. 
A link is established between strangers within a shared community of newspaper read-
ers, amounting to what Hegel called «a substitute for morning prayers». The regularity of 
publication also serves to provide a vital service for any community, namely a degree of con-
tinuity. Anderson emphasizes this when he points out the perceived link between the dead and 
the yet unborn, providing some limits to personal mortality48. The morning newspaper thus 
does a more basic service than that of an information provider. It enters a structure of every-
day nation building, for which we need a certain amount of shared rituals, habits and myths. 
We thus have a rational aspect of newspaper reading, which is information gathering, and we 
have an aspect of the same behaviour which is closer to the prerational, which is not necessar-
ily less important on that account. The way a story is presented gives us more than a shared 
system of beliefs. It is also likely to affect the way we feel about various phenomena relevant 
to our social and everyday lives. 
Nationalism, in Anderson’s interpretation, is not necessarily exclusionary. The nation 
as such is more a matter of language than of blood, and foreigners are usually welcome if only 
they will learn the language of the host country. He also distinguishes between the idea of 
destiny connected to the nation, and the idea of contamination connected to race. Race think-
ing is more a matter of class than of nation49. Here I think Anderson is onto something impor-
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tant, but that his assessment of nationalism may be a bit too optimistic. Like him, I do not 
think that nationalism has to be exclusionary, and one should strive to make one’s community 
accessible to others, regardless of culture, skin colour or other relatively arbitrary factors. 
Two points where I disagree with him, or think he should have been more nuanced are, first, 
the matter of language and language acquistion, and, second, the dividing line between the 
ideas of national destiny and racial contamination. The idea that a nation has a destiny, holy 
or otherwise, may be a dangerous facilitator of racism, even if the most important factor in the 
development of fullblown racism is the hierarchical stratification of human beings inherent to 
classism. This is a point where I agree with Anderson. 
First, language: It seems problematic to state as a fact that everyone can learn any lan-
guage the way Anderson does. Language learning is a skill and some will be better equipped 
for it than others. Whether someone is or is not capable of learning a language can depend on 
factors other than time, such as general aptitude, social proximity to native language users, 
and the resources to acquire the tools necessary for learning the relevant language. Language 
can also be a tool for conveying status, hierarchy and identity. In Black Skin, White Masks, 
Frantz Fanon explains, among other things, the role of language for establishing and main-
taining a dividing line between the civilized French colonizers and the primitive colonized 
Negro of the Antilles. «Mastery of language affords remarkable power», Fanon says. Further: 
«The Negro of the Antilles will be proportionately whiter – that is, he will be closer to being a 
real human being – in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language». Finally: «The Negro 
who knows the mother country is a demigod»50. All these quotations about language seem to 
say something of general interest about power and differential valuation of human beings. 
Fanon, both as a citizen of a colonized people and as a psychiatrist who dealt with traumatized 
patients, knew better than most what it means to be oppressed. He ascribed a basic importance 
to language because it is a primary means to convey identity and quite often status. It can 
therefore be considered a sort of capital, not necessarily secondary to the capital of money. A 
dominant language has the prerogative to define reality and normativity. The less fluent one is 
in the «master language», the less powerful and «civilized» one is regarded. 
The second point is somewhat related to the first, and also related to Foucault’s desc-
ription of pastoral power. The nation is a project common to a group of people. As Anderson 
quite correctly points out, the stakes tied to this project are rather high, as it has to do with pe-
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ople’s basic feeling of identity and social cohesion. Even on this level, one should be careful 
with how one thinks about one’s group. As Reicher and Hopkins have shown in their book 
Self and Nation, social identification necessarily involves social comparison, where one’s in-
group is experienced as distinct from various outgroups, which in turn can lead to discrimi-
nation51. Reicher and Hopkins are quick to point out that differentiation and discrimination 
are not equivalents, but are contingent on one’s attitude to one’s group and its relation to other 
groups. Once again, valuation is a decisive factor.   
If a degree of differentiation is unavoidable simply in virtue of belonging to a social 
group, it seems quite important to find out how such differentiation can retain a positive val-
ence. Not least because the way one thinks about group belonging and group identity necess-
arily has profound consequences for how one thinks about oneself, one’s personal identity and 
one’s relations with others. As human beings, we are social animals who need groups in order 
to survive and thrive, but discrimination on arbitrary grounds has often led to blatant injustic-
es and can pose a problem for liberal democracy. In light of this, one should reflect on what it 
means to be a member of a group and what kinds of value one attaches to one’s group. In the 
case of the nation, we can interpret this kind of group as a more or less stable project that one 
has in common with various relevant others. One can relate to the project of nation in multiple 
ways, but one important difference is whether one’s attitude to nation is open or closed. If it is 
open, I would expect it to be more likely for one to accept new people and impulses possibly 
at odds with one’s preconceived ideas about the nation. 
An open attitude to nationality, as I see it, implies an acceptance that one’s culture and 
community can change. Tying nationality to a sense of destiny seems more conducive to a 
closed attitude, because it can lead to a belief that such a destiny can be betrayed. Such a be-
lief does not necessarily dispose one to embrace people or experiences contrary to one’s ideas 
about the nation. This would have consequences for personal freedom, as well, because perso-
nal identity, like national identity, can either be a matter of constant creation, recreation and 
negotiation, or it can be a matter of firmly set articles of faith not to be trifled with. The latter 
seems likely to lead to neurosis and suspicion more than a healthy sense of community. Reic-
her and Hopkins point to Hitler’s Germany when they explicate the danger of thinking in 
terms of national character52. Focusing on presumed national identity (perhaps particularly 
one with a prophesied «destiny») rather than distinct patterns of variability is likely to strengt-
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hen existing stereotypes and potentials for authoritarianism. Just making such a statement, 
however, is not enough. One should also try to understand which «constellations of forces» 
that lead to one social phenomenon rather than another.      
Foucault himself would probably be sceptical to Andersons’s schema. Not only was he 
ill disposed to grand, sweeping narratives, but his ideas of social forces at war with each other 
is at odds with a strictly class oriented account. To him, a proper analysis of power and domi-
nation in a society had to take into account a multiplicity of subjugations functioning within a 
social body53. Scrutinizing the workings of capital will be important in such a model, but it 
will not be sufficient. The preceding discussion about pastoral power shows that the hierarch-
ical division between human beings is not a feature on which capitalism has a monopoly. Be-
sides the pecuniary economy proper to capitalism there is also an economy of merits and fa-
ult54 where the methods of evaluation are different from the market mechanisms of a capital-
ist economy. Merit and fault are moral categories, to the effect that the standards proper to an 
economy based on these categories must involve other metrics in addition to a critique of 
class society. 
Chancer’s sadomasochistic dynamics seem applicable to further explore this moral 
economy that Foucault mentions. Her discussion about the social dynamics of patriarchy se-
ems quite suitable for this, as there clearly is a dominant party to this structure, as well as a 
dominated party whose contribution to society is less valued. First, we have to be clear that 
there are structures of valuation more basic than the capitalist one. Here we should keep in 
mind that the function of money is to provide a standard for measuring worth. It is a fixed, ex-
ternal recognizable sign meant to provide order to our social world, and it works only for so 
long as people have faith in it. These are the factors that Douglas points to in her explanation 
of the ritualistic function of money55. The role of money is to provide a common standard for 
interpersonal transactions within a capitalist society. This is exactly the same function that 
gender provides in a patriarchal, or for that matter excessively heteronormative, society. 
In a patriarchal society, higher value is typically bestowed on virtues and positions 
associated with the male gender. This has a tendency to make women socially subordinate to 
men. Normatively, women have traditionally been considered to be closer to «nature», domes-
ticity and emotionality than men, who have been considered to be more «rational» and action 
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oriented than women56. Additionally, as Foucault reminds us, women’s pregnancy has been 
used as a pretext to control women’s bodies. Women are precious because of their reproduct-
ive function, and children are precious because they replenish the population. Because of their 
reproductive role, women also have a sacred role in the economic system of the transmission 
of household goods to descendants57. They are thereby tied to the home, domesticated. As An-
derson points out, this role, coupled with intermarriages within the bourgoisie, has also made 
it easier to solidify a hierarchical class society58. We see here that prescribed gender roles, co-
upled with a sharp stratification of classes can perpetuate, and thereby «naturalize» a hegemo-
nic order. Blood becomes perceived to be a legitimate basis for privilege.  
Even though a critique of class society is probably insufficient to account for human 
conflict and possible sources of hatred, then, it is certainly not superfluous. The conflict bet-
ween labour and capital is a basic dynamic of any society, and in Foucault’s account of the 
moral monster he identifies two antigonists: The Jacobin enemy and the anti-Jacobin enemy. 
The Jacobin enemy is here the tyrant, particularly embodied in the original monster by the 
name of king. The king is a monster because he has the power to arbitrarily break the social 
contract regulating society and thus threatens the natural development of interest by opposing 
it to the original state of nature represented by his own selfish interest59. In this regard, the 
king in Foucault’s account shares the position of the Sovereign in the work of Giorgio Agam-
ben, who is simultaneously inside and outside the law, as a foundation for the legal order, and 
the raison d’etre of the state. The king is the foundation of order, but also a danger to it, as he 
can dissolve it at will. The tyrant is a monster and a criminal in light of his arbitrary power. In 
popular literature, the myth of the tyrant as feral beast is particularly embodied in the figure of 
Marie-Antoinette, who is both a foreigner and, in light of her privileged position, believed to 
be greedy for the blood of the people. In addition to her royal privileges, Marie-Antoinette 
was known for her sexual escapades. The royal beast is therefore associated with debauchery 
and excess60. 
On the opposite side, we find another monster with several heads, which is opposed to 
the king monster, and also to the established political order. This is the anti-Jacobin enemy, 
by the name of the people in revolt. As is the case with the tyrant, the revolutionary people 
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threaten the social body and is suspected of cannibalism61. As with the despot, there is a real 
threat of violence embodied in a long oppressed people. In this case, however, the role of the 
oppressed is not to function as a formal foundation of law. We recognize here another charac-
ter from the work of Agamben. Homo sacer, the individual excluded from the law, perpetual-
ly in a precarious condition, but precisely as excluded, the homo sacer serves to define the 
status of citizenship, and may therefore be regarded as a foundation for the legal order. As an 
outcast, however, homo sacer may be regarded as a threat to the established order of things. 
How these two monsters were represented by whom, and which kind of threat that was emp-
hasized, had much to do with whose interests were at stake, which again underlines the leacy 
of Nietzsche in Foucault’s thinking. Foucault makes this especially clear in «Society Must Be 
Defended», where he says that the truth of discourse is always a truth from a decentered pos-
ition, as a vector in the perpetual war between discourses62. As the interests of the rulers and 
the oppressed are constantly at odds, any peace must not be thought of as neutral, but always 
just a metastable state of presumed equilibrium between different forces.  
The depiction of the two monsters in Foucault’s Abnormal is apt to make one think 
that different sorts of prejudices and stereotypes will manifest themselves differently in dif-
ferent social strata. I will look into this through analyses of racism, classism, homophobia and 
sexism. As these kinds of prejudices are in some ways linked, there will inevitably also be a 
degree of overlap here. 
 
5. Racism – A Class Issue 
 
To begin with racism, it is important to see the connection between this social ill and 
classism, which is remarkably similar to it. There are some striking similarities between the 
discussion about racism and white privilege in the USA in the book Whitewashing Race, and 
issues pertaining to the demonization of the British working class discussed in the book Chavs 
by the journalist Owen Jones. That there should be some common features between these phe-
nomena is unsurprising as both groups have long been oppressed by more dominant social 
groups, but scrutinizing these similarities can give us some important pointers as to why these 
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groups are sometimes demonized. In this section, I will start exploring racism and classism in 
an effort to find similarities between the mechanisms of each of these problems, and I will ex-
plore the nature of social exclusion related to the notions of race and class.  
The first thing to notice is the belief in the failure of something called «aspiration» or 
«ambition» on the side of black people and workers. These terms give a semblance of a fairly 
neutral explanation of a pervasive cultural problem. If someone is lacking in one of these virt-
ues, then they lack the will or «grit» to «succeed». If someone falls behind, then, that is beca-
use of their own individual failure to make good of the opportunities available to them. Again, 
however, we must keep in mind that virtues are always proper to a context, and what it means 
to have a «will to succeed» may not be as obvious at it seems at first glance. 
A good critique of the notion of «grit» must take into account that societies stratified 
along the lines of factors such as race or class tend to be rigged in favour of people who are 
already privileged. Being aspirational in this context means, explains Jones, to «rise above 
one’s station» to get ahead of the other members of one’s class. The lack of aspiration, defin-
ed as not being willing to rise above one’s station (perhaps out of a sense of loyalty to other 
workers) is also thought to be an inheritable vice63. The idea that features of personality are 
passed down through bloodlines is typical of racist thinking and the authors of Whitewashing 
Race point to similar mechanisms at work in the United States. As with the working class in 
Britain, the systemic colour line in the USA is presented as a moral and cultural failure, a pro-
duct of «black failure, selfdoubt and lack of effort»64. In so many words a failure of ambition 
on the part of a disadvantaged group in society.  
The emphasis on morality in a specific cultural context is interesting because it says 
something about which values are mobilized in order to maintain a given system in the face of 
undeniable social inequities. The stated intent of the critics of African-American culture is not 
to keep black people down, rather the contrary. As they see it, one must turn one’s focus away 
from colour if one is to have any hope of overcoming the «development gap» between black 
and white people. We see a persistant shift of focus from institutional barriers to individual 
failings such as antisocial choices of poor blacks leading to crime and «babies out of wed-
lock»65. Again we see a connection between morality and the regulation of populations. Theo-
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dore W. Allen has pointed out that such regulation in the colonies took the shape and form of 
limits on marriage, family life and sexual relations on the part of bond-labourers. The reason 
for that is that family would take energy away from productive labour. This regulation was 
accompanied by moral lessons about «fornication», «bastardy» and abstinence66. The connec-
tion between class, sex and morality is hence not new, and as Allen has also pointed out, one 
can easily see more or less explicit racist and sexist aspects of this triad.  
From a Foucauldian point of view, the connection between power, the correct use of 
sex and moral condemnation makes one think of biopolitics, and indeed in The Birth of Bio-
politics, he writes something that brings us closer to an understanding of the cult of ambition. 
As Foucault sees it, the standard of human excellence under neo-liberalism can be described 
as something like an entrepeneur of himself67. This entrepeneurial role is closely tied to con-
sumption and the consumer society. Through consumption the entrepeneurial man becomes a 
producer of his own satisfaction, we have therefore a view of productive relations based on 
consumption. The point of this critique of neo-liberalism is not some elaborate way of saying 
«down with capitalism», but should be understood as an attempt to show how a governing 
idea (what Foucault dubbed «governmentality») has a tendency to create in- and outgroups, in 
a way that provides necessary coordinates for behaviour and coordination of populations, but 
also leads to stigmatization of individuals who do not fit in to the prevailing system.  
The social logic pertaining to productivity and labour is an important theme in Fouc-
ault’s work, and we shall see later that it is central to the notion of homogeneity in Bataille’s 
work, as well. Linking production to consumption, and regulating this relation by the aid of a 
moral framework revolving around personal ambition, makes the individualist entrepeneurial-
ism proper to neo-liberalism a driving force for the consumer society Foucault described in 
his lectures and that remains the prevailing system in most countries. This neo-liberal disco-
urse is then habituated in the contemporary subject through various social apparata (disposit-
ifs). Production and consumption enter a kind of dialectical relatonship in Foucault’s thinking. 
Not only must one produce in order to consume, but one must consume in order to produce, 
and the product of this consumption is the entrepeneurial man himself, or rather the increase 
of his satisfaction. The way one goes about doing that is acting as a «rational actor», compet-
ing with other such actors in a competitive market. In the neo-liberal system, this is a moral 
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imperative. As the model citizen is defined as a rational agent maximizing utilities in a laissez 
faire economy, it seems to follow that the raison d’etat in this system is pecuniary capital.  
The myth of the «rational actor», or the homo oeconomicus, presumes a certain view 
of human rationality which is far from innocent, but which in our time is all too often taken 
for granted. This view of human nature carries with it a lot of consequences, which flow from 
a dominant narrative, tied to an epistemological framework particularly embodied in what we 
call «methodological individualism». Saying that the dominant narrative carries with it certain 
consequences is not in itself a condemnation of the narrative, as the same thing would be true 
of any such narrative, including the prevailing framework’s opposite. Given the current narra-
tive, which is being discussed by Foucault, one would presume that each actor’s chosen action 
in the markets available to them is a purely individual venture, where fairness is ensured thro-
ugh the market’s propensity to self-regulate. All it comes down to then is individual effort and 
«grit». As with other divine miracles, the magic of the market requires the aid of humans.   
The logic behind this culturally prescribed production of satisfaction has been discuss-
ed a bit earlier on in this paper. It is present in Security, Territory, Population in connection 
with the development of the police and its role in securing the happiness of citizens and the 
splendor of the state. Rather than being just an individual venture, the manifacture of satisfac-
tion is necessary for the maintenance of a society’s internal order. Producing a semblance of 
free choice is vital for securing the will to produce and the system’s legitimacy, but only with-
in certain boundaries provided by the logic of the prevailing system. This dependency is con-
ducive to normative rules of behaviour that keeps deviance in check, but also to institutions 
that ensure obedience to the system. Conformity within a system of prescribed freedom neces-
sitates a security apparatus, which is built to serve the dominant discourse, which here is a 
neo-liberal one. As indicated by Foucault, such an apparatus is likely to operate in the shape 
and form of a system of police, particularly exemplified by the penitentiary, or prison. The 
people who are most vulnerable to this institution will be individuals who deviate from the 
prevailing raison d’etat, which in this case will be people who are short on money. 
Jones writes about the phenomenon of teenage gangs who in many people’s minds are 
linked to crime68. These gangs are often from poor families and are thus heterogenous to the 
order of capital. As we have seen, standing outside the reigning order of society is perilous in 
many ways, one of them being perceived as a threat in one’s own right. In a system where 
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«cash is king» in a literal sense, poverty may be considered a punishable vice. The anti-social 
behaviour associated with teenage gangs is typically blamed on bad parenting and moral fail-
ure, while Jones argues that it would be more constructive to provide these kids with other op-
portunities for validation and success. What is most interesting in this context are the various 
governmental tactics against deviance which can be summarized under the heading «Tough 
on Crime», particularly the legion of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders, issued by New Labour. 
These orders served to strengthen the link between teenage gangs and criminal behaviour in 
popular opinion and vastly increased the number of young people in jail without serving any 
rehabilitative function. We have then a dispositif that serves to strengthen a given stereotype, 
which in turn feeds into the phantasm «criminal pauper». It might be worth asking whether re-
habilitation is really the purpose of the penal system. Foucault argued that it wasn’t. 
According to Foucault, the penal system was developed to protect the interests of a so-
cial category with an interest in order against another social class dedicated to disorder69, or 
the bourgoisie against the proletariat. The legal order of a given society works in favour of the 
ruling class, which helps explain why teenagers from poor families are often associated with 
crime. Turning now to the monsters in Abnormal, we see that the social category Foucault in-
dicates here is the manyheaded monster by the name of the people in revolt, whose ferocity 
and potential for violence was a source of terror for the upper classes. The police, and in ex-
tention the penal system, is here used not only, or even primarily, as a means towards social 
harmony, but as a weapon to pacify the potential for revolt among the many in order to satisfy 
the interests of the affluent few. The prison, then, does not work to make itself superfluous, as 
the case would be if it had rehabilitation as its main goal, but rather for the continuity of the 
system itself. For this purpose, creating an image of threatening working class teenagers is far 
more useful than the healing of social wounds and the restoration of trust between all the soc-
iety’s members. One must by all means ensure that the wounds remain open because it serves 
to strengthen the perceived need of a political status quo which produces delinquency in order 
to delinate a barrier between «decent society» on the one hand and what someone named Tar-
get called a «bastardized race»70. 
There is a couple of things to notice about the preceding critique of the penitentiary. 
First, the words «bastardized race» seems to indicate a connection between the hierarchical 
stratification of a class society and racial thinking. The word «bastard» calls to mind the fear 
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of «babies out of wedlock» associated with African-Americans, which implies a lack of con-
trol over people perceived to stand outside civilized order. Second, capital seems to be present 
in two senses. There is the classical Marxist one, that pecuniary capital tends to accumulate 
and get progressively more concentrated in a few centres, which is true on an international 
scale as well as, to a varying extent, within countries. There is also a sense that social capital 
attaches itself to factors that are not necessarily pecuniary. One of these factors is skin colour. 
Foucault points out that this mechanism is salient in the colony, where any solidarity between 
working class representatives of the colonizing power and the peoples being colonized was ef-
fectively curtailed by racialized images of the colonized peoples as cannibals, that is danger-
ous individuals71. A similar mechanism may work between workers of the same ethnic group, 
where the incarcarated people are pathologized, such that a person breaking the law becomes 
associated with degeneracy, such that the criminal is close to the animal, to be feared as a 
ferocious beast far removed from the virtues of the bourgeoisie. The stereotypes relevant to 
the colony will then to a certain extent be relevant to the prison and vice versa. 
As the authors of Whitewashing Race point out, white Americans have accumulated 
advantages in housing, work, education and security based solely on skin colour, which has 
led to a «possessive investment in whiteness»72. In the minds of many whites, this investment 
tends to take the form of a zero-sum game where white people feel that they must hold black 
people at bay in order to protect their own privileges. If black people get ahead, it is assumed, 
that must result in a corresponding loss for white people. Thus relative group status, based on 
colour, as well as individual advancement becomes important, which cements the segregation 
between black and white people, and so on in a vicious circle73. This may be particularly sali-
ent among groups of persons from ethnic majorities who are otherwise disadvantaged, as one 
will tend to grasp for the privileges one does have in the light of deficiencies in other forms of 
capital. This does not necessarily mean that disadvantaged people are more racist than people 
who are better off (the opposite may be the case, as they are more likely to establish bonds of 
friendship with other disadvantaged people), but their racism may be more aggressive where 
it does occur. Reicher and Hopkins’ work on identity and nation is interesting here, because it 
does go some way in helping one understand «white nationalism» as a concept. If a group of 
people attaches great value to skin colour as an important identity marker, and that in turn is 
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attached to the struggle for scarce resources, then that group’s value system is likely to provi-
de fertile ground for discriminatory group formations, potentially of a violent kind.  
A third thing to notice is that more than just being an institution meant to correct mis-
demeanors and punish criminals, the prison becomes central to a kind of social logic. In line 
with what we have seen regarding biopolitics, it is this logic that makes out the discursive 
basis for the penitentiary, while the penitentiary serves as an administrative tool for inclusion 
and exclusion of individuals according to the normative order, such that the ideological basis 
of a social order may be upheld. The penal system is the mechanism that makes a stratified 
society work with a certain degree of stability. This system is, in other words, a guarantee for 
the privileged classes in opposition to the most numerous group in society, the underprivileg-
ed. One must suppose that this opposition is particularly salient in the face of a potentially re-
volutionary popular group, which calls to mind the moral monsters of Foucault’s Abnormal. If 
the penal system represents the remains of a despotic monarchy, as Foucault claims in The 
Will to Knowledge74, and the logic of the prison can be generalized, then it seems to follow 
that there is a fundamental tension between the state and the people, because the king is one 
of two opposing monsters in Abnormal. The despot is dangerous because of his excessive 
power, which holds potential for arbitrary violence. The king represents a sort of ultimate 
power and his spirit endures in the pen. 
According to Foucault, the model of the prison was generalized to the family, the ar-
my, the workshop and the school, in short to society, with the goal being general obedience to 
the prevailing system75. In order to ensure such obedience, a hierarchy of delinquents was est-
ablished, through which the police would be capable to keep tabs on the entire social field76. 
In other words, through the production of delinquency the police was enabled to establish an 
all-pervasive panopticon. This is the Benthamite construction which allowed for control over 
groups of individuals through a constant sense that someone in the tower at the centre of the 
field could be watching your every move77. The brilliance of the panopticon lies particularly 
in the fact that the presence of the tower and the consciousness that someone might be watch-
ing you makes a lot of actual surveillance on the part of the authorities rather superfluous. The 
targets of surveillance are placed in a situation where they, through their own self-awareness, 
are the relays of their own imprisonment. Disciplinary power is at the same time individualiz-
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ing and normalizing through the individual’s obedience to the system, the system itself being 
the normative social field within which various strategies of power is made possible and to 
some extent socially acceptable.  
Foucault hints at something to this effect in «Society Must Be Defended» where he 
claims that power is exercised through networks, and individuals are the relays of this power, 
rather than inert, consenting targets. Power is both an effect and producer of social fields and 
it is submitted and exercised through individuals, who in turn are effects and relays of power. 
This does not imply an even distribution of power, but it does imply that, far from being a sta-
tic phenomenon, power works differently throughout the social body. We get a skewed under-
standing of power if we focus too much on the great power centres and too little on its every-
day functions78. Power must be studied from the bottom up. In the case of Foucault’s panoptic 
model, this implies moving one’s focus from Bentham’s tower, never forgetting its function, 
and taking a look at what the snitches, or «crows», are doing. 
The crows in Foucault’s narrative are the intendants, syndics and guards who see to it 
that none of the citizens in a plague infested town leave their area of residence and that every-
thing is in order. They are people of little consequence, but with some authority as middlemen 
and observers. They are in turn watched by good officers trusted to ensure the obedience of 
the people and the authority of the magistrates. In order to ensure total control over the town a 
constant regimen of observation, registration and report is established. The plague is met with 
order, disorder is met with discipline. The citizens of the town can be regarded as a group, but 
each citizen is also individualized by means of epidemiological analysis. Confinement is nec-
essary in this instance because the plague is contagious, but there is a danger that the plague 
as narrative achieves hegemony as social discourse. Thus, «contagion» becomes a danger as-
sociated with every deviance that is perceived to be a challenge to hierarchy and order. The 
«leper» becomes the symbolic inhabitant of a space later populated by beggars, vagabonds, 
madmen and the disorderly79. This is a feature that is particularly salient in the colony. 
 
6. Privilege extended 
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Imperialism has been a horribly bloody affair. Academically, however, it lends itself 
quite well to studies on the mechanisms of hatred, ressentiment and, of course, racism. The 
exploitation of human beings in distant lands, on the grounds that they were creatures of a lo-
wer kind, has led to political and economic hardships that exist even today, and to racist ideas 
about «underdeveloped peoples». In this chapter I will take a closer look on imperialism and 
its ideological causes and effects the better to explore the nature of racism and the rise of ani-
mosity and hatred between different groups of people. Because of the exploitative nature of 
the imperial project, the present analysis will also lend itself to the study of power and its con-
nection with knowledge and morality. 
We see an ideological connection between law and nature and a hierarchy of normativ-
ity and deviance, which seems to be linked with the economy of faults and merits mentioned 
in Security, Territory, Population. Note here that faults and merits are not necessarily categor-
ies based on achieved accomplishment. They denote value, and value is a socially contingent 
marker. In a strictly normative society deviance, of whatever kind, in itself becomes a fault 
and in a racist society whiteness becomes a virtue. This makes it expedient to consult Fanon 
again, where we see that not only is the black man regarded as a type whose personhood is 
diminished, but there is a hierarchy among colonized peoples. A person from the Antilles will 
not stand being taken for a Senegalese, and a Martinician will take offense if a person from 
Guadeloupe tries to pass off as one of them. The Martinician regards himself as less «savage» 
because he is closer to the white man.  
The more one is seen as a black man, the more savage and childlike one is thought to 
be, even among colonized black people80. Both characteristics can be regarded as a perceived 
lack of civilization, or «being closer to the jungle», as Fanon put it. The eye of the magistrate 
leads to discrimination even amongst inmates under the same tower. This learned prejudice 
has another side to it, as well, as Fanon explains. The situation in which the colonized people 
find themselves, and the consequences this situation has on the minds of both black and white 
people, naturally build up a lot of anger. This anger shows itself in situations where teachers 
and physicians go down to the level of the natives by speaking as if to a child, or in pidgin. 
This behaviour does not necessarily reveal any ill intent, it comes naturally because the colon-
ial situation creates the atmosphere for it. Even a person as aware and sensitive to the colonial 
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situation as Fanon admits to a degree of slippage81. The colonial situation and its ontological 
commitments lead to dysfunctional interpersonal conduct and to social alienation. 
In such a situation, two strategies seem to be available to the colonized person. Either 
one can resist, perhaps to the point of establishing a counterforce to the prevailing hierarchy 
of power, or one can cooperate by demonstrating one’s allegiance to the prevailing system. 
Passivity might be a third option, but given the pervasive functioning of the colonial structure, 
it seems very unlikely, probably impossible, to actually avoid reacting to the situation in eith-
er of the first two ways. Resistance is here most likely to be the preferred strategy before it is 
put to the test, but it is not necessarily the strategy one chooses to follow in practice. This is 
quite understandable, as by cooperating one can escape hardships that befall those who resist, 
and get access to goods and privileges that are not available to people who do not cooperate. 
This will in turn probably influence the value system of the people coopted into the colonial 
system. Cooperation, then, is likely to be seen in practice as a viable option. Hannah Arendt 
once wrote about Jews who cooperated in the Nazi camp system, the same thing could be said 
about various people in Norway under Nazi occupation (particularly the police) and Caroline 
Elkins writes about a substantial loyalist army in Kenya under British colonial rule. 
    The Kenyan loyalist army consisted of several native Kenyans who joined the ranks 
of the Home Guard and were rewarded with Loyalty Sertificates allowing them to run for off-
ice, vote in elections and walk around freely. They were also granted permission to plant and 
sell cash crops, and they were exempted from special taxes all detainees had to pay even if 
they had no source of income82. The British colonizers in Kenya had created a system not tot-
ally unlike the one Foucault writes about in Discipline and Punish. The precondition for set-
ting up the colonial structure in Kenya was economic decline, which led to a shift from the 
«imperialism of free trade» to settler colonialism. Economic motives were followed by a mor-
al pretext grounded in the idea of a «civilizing mission». People who cooperate with the col-
onial power will probably buy into this rhetoric. They will see a superiour civilization ready 
to bestow upon their society the means to higher living standards, if only their fellow citizens 
will give up their traditional customs holding them back. It is then the loyalists who stand for 
progress and civilization in opposition to reactionary nationalists and criminals standing in the 
way of enlightenment and prosperity. We have here two different strategies based on two dif-
ferent interpretations of the colonial situation. The defenders of both strategies believe that 
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their fight is the just one, and wishes the other side would take off their blindfold and see the 
truth. Corresponding to these strategies, we have two different moral frameworks, the func-
tion of which is to justify different positions. The loyalists identify with the imperial power 
the oath takers oppose, and the imperialists will draw moral inspiration from the loyalists.  
Through Christian values, superiour genetics and economic know-how, the Britons 
had obliged themselves to bring light to the Dark Continent. Following the notion of politics 
as the continuation of war laid out in «Society Must Be Defended», we can speak of a project 
for world peace on terms set by the imperialist powers and their missionaries (the Pax Britan-
nica). We find someting to that effect in Anderson, as well, who claims that the British colon-
izers in India introduced a school system, designed to create a class of persons «Indian in blo-
od and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals and in intellect.» The Indians were to 
abandon their Hindu ways and embrace Christianity, the religion of civilization83.  
For the civilizing mission to have any prospects of succeeding, obedience had to be 
ensured through paternalistic authority84. The civilizing mission depended, in the minds of the 
colonizers, on a mixture of discipline and aristocratic pedigree. It would be a mistake to think 
of imperialist civilization as a project exclusive to Chritianity, however. Tendencies of imper-
ialism and slavery have been present in other cultures, as well, (take the Ottoman Empire, for 
instance) and Warren Montag mentions a similar tendency based on a teleological view of 
evolution, which he calls «creationism without a creator»85. This in turn is a classic origin for 
biopolitics, where the fitness of a population is bargained for through the privileged treatment 
of «fit» individuals. From the point of view of the colonizer, the colonial situation not only re-
flects the natural dominance of the stronger race, but it is also an opportunity for the weaker 
race to be brought up a couple of steps on the evolutionary ladder. In order for that to happen, 
a healthy regimen under the auspices of the colonizing power is necessary. The differences 
between civilizations calls for a biopolitics of colonialism for the good of humanity.   
In a colonial situation such as the one presently being discussed, there will be tensions 
between black and white, between loyalists and oppositionists or oath takers, and between 
people situated on the margins of any of these groups. Constant racial contempt and systemic 
and physical violence on the part of the colonialists, aided and abetted by loyalist natives, will 
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leave festering wounds of hatred that remain long after the colonial forces have retreated from 
the scene. The censorship falling on anyone who tried to speak about the atrocities happening 
in Kenya contributed to a lack of reconciliation that keeps old hatreds alive86. 
Much the same mechanisms were at work in Rwanda, where colonial favourization of 
Tutsi natives contributed to an atmosphere of suspicion and hatred that resulted in the massac-
res of 1994. Other factors than ideology must be taken into account. Gérard Prunier mentions 
a great number of people on a relatively small area as a contributing factor to the tragedy of 
1994, but racial thinking by colonial powers was decisive in forming the discriminatory social 
structures that fostered hatred and later genocide87. The Tutsi were considered to be closer to 
the Europeans, and therefore, tellingly, «meant to reign» over the Hutu Rwandans88. This 
«manifest destiny» was supported by European anthropology that had the authoritative status 
of «science»89. The history of colonial exploitation, then, is clearly a phenomenon that lends 
itself to analysis of the power/knowledge kind. Studies of skulls and observation of social 
phenomena from a European imperialist perspective lent themselves to the support of ideas 
about inherent superiority and imagined social types. One should not be surprised in this con-
text to find strong ressentiment amongst the supposedly inferiour Hutu, who came to hate all 
Tutsi90. Lasting contempt by European colonialists and relatively privileged Tutsi neighbours 
contributed to a trajectory of hatred that ultimately exploded in terrible vengeance. 
There were certain characteristics believed to be common to the different «races». It is 
important to keep those in mind because they tell us something about the racial mythology 
that provided a sense of legitimacy to the colonial project. The African «savages» were belie-
ved, first of all, to be biologically inferiour. According to popular myth, they were also stupid, 
they lacked the capacity to feel pain, they had low nutritional needs, yet they were sexually 
aggressive, thus threatening the racial purity of the settlers91. Through a mythology of racial 
destiny, Africans were permanently assigned to an underclass of manual labourers. The Euro-
pean empires were places where class and racial thinking merged, and this to a great extent set 
the rules for the strategic field of interacting forces. 
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To the imperialist, the colonial subjects were not regarded as equal persons. We see 
that in the differential treatment given to loyalists and oath takers, and we see it in the case of 
the favourization of Tutsi over Hutu Rwandese. We have to see this in light of the mission 
civilisatrice the European imperialists had given themselves. According to Foucault, there are 
two tropes that stand outside of civilization. One of these is the savage, and the other is the 
barbarian. The savages are relatively benign in that one may trade with them and they are 
motivated by self-interest92. In the British case, these would be the loyalists. They are people 
who are not yet properly civilized, but for whom there is hope if only they are exposed to cor-
rect training. The other trope is the barbarian. The barbarians are dangerous individuals out-
side civilization against which they place themselves in an adversarial position. Being thus 
defined as opposed to civilization, this trope cannot exist without an existing civilization. The 
modi operandi of the barbarians are not barter and cultivation of land, but plunder and domi-
nation93. The barbarians cannot be presented sympathetically, because they represent a count-
erforce to the progress of civilization. They will not give up their freedom and are therefore 
seen as violent and monstrous.  
The barbarism of a colonized people calls to mind the popular monster from Abnorm-
al, but there is more to this trope than this similarity. If plunder and domination are activities 
associated with the barbarian, then the oath takers would certainly not be wrong to ascribe a 
degree of barbarianism to the European conquerors. Neither would it be surprising if the con-
querors recognized some barbarism in themselves. In such a situation it would be the more 
important to create and maintain a clear division between the clolonizer and the colonized. 
The colonized could not be perceived as a human being on par with the colonizer, but rather 
as a pet or a piece of property94. The racial discourses present in scientific anthropology will 
certainly be a useful tool in this regard, but discourses in ordinary media channels will per-
haps be even more important, if we keep in mind the relative predominance of such media, 
and the link between news media and the feeling of shared identity. In order to keep power 
relations as stable as possible, it would be in the interest of the ruling classes to establish a 
social ladder of humanity where the closer one is to whiteness and wealth, the closer one is to 
a proper human being.          
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In such a situation, there seem to be two logical ways in which the white worker can 
interact with the black worker. One is cooperation, as they are both placed at the lower end of 
a social ladder set down by people who oppress all of them and whom they outnumber. The 
other possible strategy is to ally themselves with the system’s ruling elite. If skin colour is a 
form of capital, then the present situation affords them opportunities that are not available to 
the losers of the lottery of colour. Proximity to the ruling strata is associated with temptations 
that are hard to resist, thus we see that the idea of contagion is not only relevant to the leper, 
but also to the aristocrat, but with opposite flavour. Friends of the rulers may even aspire to 
reach the top of the pyramid and become rulers themselves. In such a setup, the masters in po-
wer have much to gain from appeals to racism.  
Such a view is supported by Theodore W. Allen. He cites Edmund S. Morgan in say-
ing that American plantation owners, in order to guard against a unified rebellion from the 
ranks of disappointed freemen and desperate slaves, did what they could to foster the con-
tempt of whites for blacks and Indians. The instrument for this manufacturing of racism was 
the law. Through differential access to certain benefits it was hoped that one could «seperate 
free whites from dangerous slave blacks by a screen of racial contempt»95. Allen also cites 
Lerone Bennett Jr., in offering three bearing points for the socio-economic explanation of 
racism: First, that racial slavery constituted a ruling-class response to a problem of labour 
solidarity. Second, that a system of racial privileges for the propertyless «whites» was delibe-
rately instituted in order to align them on the side of the plantation owners against African-
American bond-labourers. Third, that the consequence of such a policy had disastrous conse-
quences for white and black labourers96. Racism was constructed by property owners in order 
to manipulate the social field through a policy of divide and rule. 
Foucault seems to be indicating something similar when he claims that history should 
be understood as the history of race struggle97. Such a claim is apt to provoke immediate dis-
gust, because it makes one think of such things as eugenics and social Darwinism. Yet there is 
really nothing in the biography of Foucault that should make one believe that he was particul-
arly racist. In «Society Must Be Defended» he claims that the social body is articulated around 
two races, and that the clash between them runs through society from top to bottom. There are 
differences between these races such as ethnic differences, differences between languages and 
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different degrees of force, energy and violence. The struggle between these races leads to the 
subjugation of one race by another98.  
Now, from biological research we know that there really are no different races as such, 
and from historical research we know that the concept of «race» is an ideological construct 
that has some force as a social phenomenon. In order to make sense of Foucault’s words we 
must focus on the social field. Foucault gives credence to this interpretaion when he says that 
what he sees as a binary rift within society is not a clash between two distinct races, but the 
splitting of a single race into a superrace and a subrace99. Furthermore, he denies that «race» 
is pinned to a stable biological meaning, but comes about because of differences in language 
and often religion. Barriers between races consist in various differences in privileges, cust-
oms, rights, wealth and power100. In other words, various social markers are used to justify the 
subjugation of one group by another. Speaking about the struggle between these groups as a 
class struggle places the discourse in the domain of Marxism, and perhaps an overemphasis 
on purely socio-economic factors, which was not something Foucault would be willing to put 
up with. In Foucault’s thinking processes of normalization and normative subjugation were 
more central phenomena, and his theory of race struggle must be seen in light of this. 
These social markers that Foucault mentions are not just arbitrary factors, rather they 
contribute in creating social cohesion and identity. To a significant extent it was these factors 
that colonizers attacked in order to subjugate their new colonial subjects. Allen emphasizes 
this when he says that it is typical for the colonizing power to disregard and delegitimate al-
ready existing social distinctions regulating the society of the colonized people. These are dis-
tinctions based on kinship and tribal identity. The aim of such policies is subjugation through 
social death. This kind of racial oppression normally comes prior to national oppression101. 
According to Foucault, biological-racist discourses of degeneracy, as well as institutions that 
serve to exclude and segregate, have their roots in the normalizing function inherent to the 
discourse of race struggle102. It is a kind of discourse that serves to subjugate and even exter-
minate various peoples because they are considered inferiour. Thus, my initial claim that soc-
ieties tend to create their own outcasts is supported by Foucault, who links this tendency with 
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the development of what he calls State racism103. Foucault’s discourse is not racist, rather it 
provides conceptual tools for understanding the phenomenon of racism. 
 
7. On Chiefs and Monsters 
 
For Foucault, actual racism is a distortion of the discourse on race struggle, and replac-
es the theme of historical war with a postevolutionist theme of the struggle for existence. This 
distortion takes place at about the same time that the notion of race struggle is taken over by 
the notion of class struggle. For the State, this means that it goes from being an instrument 
that one race uses against another to be a protector of the integrity, superiority and purity of 
the race104. The State goes from being a locus of conflict and struggle for domination to an 
exclusionary tool for the purity of the fittest race, guided by a new ideology of social Darwin-
ism. In order to do that, it is necessary to create an underclass, such as Allen and Brown et al 
have demonstrated. On the other hand, we have seen that discourses tend to engender counter-
discourses. The powers that be will meet resistance, imperialism will meet oath takers and 
truths will encounter alternatives. According to Foucault, there is no power without resistance. 
In this section, I will explore Bataille’s notions of homogeneity and heterogeneity through a 
reading of his Psychological Structure of Fascism in conjunction with the tensions between 
master («Jupiterian») discourses and counterdiscourses elaborated by Foucault. I will explore 
the affective potential that lies in the counterdiscourse and investigate how tensions between 
various discourses in a political setting can lead to hatred and violent aggression. In doing 
this, I will prepare the ground for a more substantial theoretical basis for the rest of the thesis. 
I will here rely on anthropological work focusing on Francois Duvalier’s regime in Haiti and 
the election of Donald Trump as president of the USA.   
For Bataille, there is a basic rift in society between factors constituting what he calls 
«homogeneity» on the one hand and, correspondingly, «heterogeneity» on the other. «Homo-
geneity» is here understood as commensurability of elements and the awareness of this com-
mensurability, based on fixed rules that stem from mental principles of identification of per-
sons and situations105. Homogenous society is the productive, or useful, society, and useless 
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and violent elements are excluded from the homogenous sphere106. In this way an Outside is 
created consisting of forms that are impossible to assimilate, both socially and scientifically. 
According to Bataille, social and scientific assimilation share a single structure, the goal of 
which is to establish homogeneity and functional satisfaction107. The heterogenous world is 
largely made up by the sacred, which in turn is linked to the categories of mana and taboo. 
These are, in the first case, thought of as mysterious and impersonal forces possessed by indi-
viduals such as kings and witch doctors, and in the second case social prohibition of contact 
with e.g. cadavers and menstruating women108. 
An interesting case in this regard is the use made by Papa Doc Duvalier of Vodou in 
setting himself up as a dictator in Haiti. The Vodou religion is particularly interesting in this 
context because the relationship between the spirit world and the mundane (or in Bataillean 
parlance: profane) world is so salient there. In my opinion, transcendence is a more visible 
aspect of the Vodou religion than the Christian one. The historic and geopolitical situation of 
Haiti makes this country even more interesting.  
The successful uprising against French colonial rule, resulting in Haitian independence 
in 1804, has served as an inspiration for anticolonial struggles elsewhere. It must be remem-
bered that this was a spectacularly bloody affair, which is understandable as a reaction to 
years of colonial oppression. Jean-Jaques Dessalines defined Haiti as a «black» state of indi-
gènes, which must be seen in light of previous European («white») rule and the strategic 
space of relations colonization had contributed to establish. Simultaneously, this first Haitian 
Emperor hunted down practitioners of the indigenous Vodou religion, which must also be 
considered as a strategic move in the context of the resultant interplay of various forces. This 
same religion had played an emancipatory role in both the opposition to French colonial rule 
and was later to be oppressed during US occupation (1915-1934) and the Catholic Church’s 
«anti-superstition» campaign of 1941109. The Vodou religion thus had important symbolic 
functions through its emancipatory role, and as a constitutive force of a popular movement. 
There was, then, a multiplicity of sacred, profane, homogenous and heterogenous forces in the 
Haitian social field where Papa Doc would take on the function of chief and absolute ruler.      
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In Bataille’s ideas about the heterogenous as something beyond the realm of the hom-
ogenous, and about figures of authority and status, such as the king and witch doctor, on the 
one hand and exclusion based on social prohibition on the other, it is possible to recognize Fo-
ucault’s ideas about the law and the monsters on the outside of the law presented in Abnormal 
and dicussed above here. The lower strata of society belong to the heterogenous realm beca-
use they cannot be assimilated and provoke feelings of disgust and repulsion110. As we have 
seen, and particularly emphasized by Nietzsche, this contempt tends to build up resentment in 
those who are thus discriminated, which in turn can be a potent force in the constantly devel-
oping social field. We see this quite clearly in the Papa Doc case, as he played on real and 
imagined tensions between the «state» (urban and elite, white and mulatto, and Catholics) and 
«nation» (rural and poor, black, and Vodouists)111. 
The limits between heterogenous and homogenous must not be seen as constant, but 
rather as latent potentialities in more or less stable political and epistemological frameworks. 
Foucault explains that heterogeneity is not a principle of exclusion, and does not prevent co-
existence, conjunction or connection. Various heterogenous factors stand in strategic relations 
to each other, such that different phenomena are held together with strategic links112. In a pol-
itical setting, this strategic interplay of forces would probably involve various social projects 
with different ideas about the nature and goals of community. The boundaries between the 
homogenous realm and the heterogenous realm can be more or less strict, depending largely 
on historic trajectories. 
Bataille’s work can further help explaining concepts such as the sacredness of the king 
and how this figure can constitute the law while remaining outside of it. The heterogenous is 
difficult to describe, as it escapes scientific definition, yet it seems largely to define the homo-
genous because it constitutes a limit case, and as such it serves to define the boundaries of the 
homogenous world. One can also see hints of Foucault’s pastoral power in that virtues such as 
duty, discipline and obedience are central virtues within the homogenous realm, which are 
mobilized in order to serve the chief who stands as a sort of raison d’etre of the national com-
munity113. Furthermore, as Agamben emphasizes, the Sovereign is himself a sort of liminal 
figure in that he represents the intersection between justice and violence114. Devotion to a sup-
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reme leader is therefore likely to imply aggression to persons who are perceived as the chief’s 
enemies. If the violent order of sovereignty is mixed with the politics of population proper to 
biopolitics, we have classic fascism according to the Foucauldian schema. 
The chief is here a totalising principle where the principles of religious and martial 
power are concentrated in one person. The fact that the chief stands for the collective raison 
d’etre of state power implies the simultaneous destruction of every other imperative form that 
is opposed to it115. This allows for the identification of the chief with a higher Idea, and the 
people’s identification with the sovereign such that his glory becomes the people’s glory116. 
Papa Doc’s appropriation of Vodou as an instrument of state power is a remarkable case in 
point. Johnson summarizes Duvalier’s doctrine in three points, which I repeat here verbatim: 
(1) Haiti is Black and must be ruled by Blacks; (2) ethnic cohesion requires its own religious 
symbol, Vodou; (3) the national faith must have a national leader117. The national Idea is here 
defined by religious identity, which is associated with (indigène) race. In this way an exclus-
ionary ethno-state is developed, centered around the person of the leader. There are strong 
historic and political factors that lend credence to such a political project, but importantly we 
must notice here how popular notions of belonging and identity are appropriated by one per-
son, making him in effect the constitutive symbol of the Haitian nation state. 
A brilliant move in this particular venture is Duvalier’s emphasis on factors previously 
associated with low status, but important to a large constituency in the country. A constituen-
cy that was previously largely excluded. The hopes and desires of this population are then re-
presented by the chief, and whatever is outside the ideological sphere of the chief is looked 
upon with fear and suspicion, and not without good reason. The chief embodies the homogen-
ous realm of the body politic. As Foucault has pointed out many times, however, the body po-
litic is a concept liable to be misleading. We must constantly bear in mind the struggles going 
on beneath the throne of the emperor, the forces of which the chief is but one representation. 
Even when the chief seems to embody the supreme power of the State, he is after all just one 
individual, constituted by and functioning as a relay of the power of a larger social field. In 
this case, Duvalier has tapped into social forces with remarkable social potency, such as indi-
genous religion and repressed nationalism. 
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The totalising power of the chief is, in the Duvalier case, made possible through a 
mixture of political manouvering and personal mana. First, he removed access to weapons 
from common soldiers and gave them to his own loyal Palace Guard, many of whom were re-
cruited amongst the ranks of Vodou priests. Second, he expelled all church leaders involved 
with the anti-superstition campaign, thus simultaneously demonstrating strength and getting 
rid of potential political opponents. Third, he pleased the power brokers in the USA by perse-
cuting communists and leftist students118. At the same time he cultivated a public image as 
spiritually possessed by the nation’s founder, Dessalines, who was rumoured to be a clandest-
ine devotee of Vodou and whose martial ferocity and «black authenticity» carried weight119. 
While the national religion was militarized, the legitimacy of political and military power was 
supported by an active use of national religion, which also provided a framework for political 
practice during Duvalier’s reign. In line with Bataille’s proposed structure, religious and mili-
tary power merged in the person of the chief, or supreme leader, who represented the nation 
as legitimate manifestation of the popular will. 
 Thus, the power of the chief turns infamy into order and glory, and the persecution of 
the chief’s enemies becomes an exalted duty. Like Foucault, Bataille emphasizes the disap-
pearance of revolutionary discourse as a precondition for the development of fascism120. This 
seems to leave the impoverished classes with two options: Subversive action, going against 
the current structures of power vs imperative action where they choose to identify themselves 
with the sovereign and, through vanquishing his enemies, hope for a social salvation through 
his power. The persecution of leftists and the concentration of power in the hands of the chief 
makes the subversive strategy collectively rational, but given the attractions of power and the 
risks inherent to subversion, it would not be surprising to see members from the working class 
invest their energy and identities in the imperative form. This is even more likely in a case 
such as this, where the chief reinvigorates symbols associated with the disposessed.  
Two other aspects of Bataille’s essay are important in the context of the present thesis. 
One is that the sovereign, as an imperative heterogeneity, is sadistic without a corresponding 
masochism121. From what we have seen earlier on in this thesis, we can take this as implying 
that the sovereign’s power is beyond the dependence present in a normal sadomasochistic 
structure. Because the sovereign is above the law, and because he constitutes the raison d’etre 
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of the state, he is vested with a power without constraint, which again is characteristic of the 
king as moral monster. The other thing to notice is the description that Bataille attaches to the 
lowest strata of society, giving an impression as of a contagious air. The destitute people in 
what he calls «advanced civilizations» have something in common with India’s caste of un-
touchables122. Contact with the heterogenous is subject to taboo, and heterogeneity, as we 
have seen, is bound up with social status in both directions. But where the presence of the 
king calls forth feelings of glory and exaltation, the presence of the beggar or the prostitute 
provokes feelings of disgust.   
As we have seen, the relationship between the homogenous and the heterogenous 
realms is not as straight forward as a superficial reading of Bataille may make one believe. 
The heterogenous and the homogenous are not static realms, but mutually definitory aspects 
of social and epistemological situations. The heterogenous must here be understood as the 
liminal Outside of the established Inside that makes up the homogenous. These structures are 
not entirely commensurable, but neither are they entirely exclusionary. They are strategically 
related to each other, such that they are able to join together in specific junctures. This seems 
to imply potential for change and variability in relations of forces. We must try to see the re-
lationship between the homogenous and the heterogenous in light of Foucault’s opposition 
between «Jupiterian history» and counterhistory (Foucault explicitly uses the word «hetero-
geneity»)123. In this regard there is one more aspect of Duvalier’s political persona that is of 
interest here, namely his use of the Vodouan loa (spirit) Baron Samedi.  
According to legend, Baron Samedi is a liminal spirit par excellence. He is the loa of 
senators and diplomats124, so one can say that his formal role is as a sort of divine door open-
er. He is also a ruler of graveyards and a connoisseur of healing urbs, he makes his horses (the 
people he possesses) dress up according to their opposite sex and as offering he accepts clairin 
and rum125. He is also said to be fond of foul language and obscenities, but regularly keeps 
himself in a dignified manner. He is thus representative of homogeneity and heterogeneity at 
the same time. He can be said to represent a heterogenous potential inside the realm of homo-
geneity, and seems to some extent to turn accepted normativity upside down. Discursively, 
Baron Samedi can be said to represent a counterdiscourse inherent to the divine (dominant) 
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order. I would argue that the symbolic connotations of Baron Samedi can tell us something 
about a political earth quake far away from Haiti: The 2016 election of Donald Trump. 
As Jason L. Mast claims in the book Politics of Meaning/ Meaning of Politics, the 
defining feature of the 2016 election is the amount of noncivil criteria and anticivil symbolism 
present in the civil sphere during the election campaign126. Mast defines the civil sphere as a 
structure of meaning and a feeling of membership and belonging. It is a sort of greater com-
munity, where one is respected and where one bestows respect on others, even without know-
ing them personally. One is at home in a discursive structure within which one is «free from 
hesitation or doubt that one might fail to embody the sphere’s criteria for inclusion in some 
absolute and perfect sense»127. One will recognize Foucault’s notions of counterhistories and 
the opposing «Jupiterian» history here. One will also recognize Anderson’s thoughts about the 
imagined community, where one is ultimately willing to give one’s life for a person one does 
not know because of a feeling of community with others stemming, for example, from the 
morning newspaper. Depending on the various narratives within a social sphere, and the rela-
tive power of these narratives, the sense of belonging and social and personal identity can feel 
more or less beleaguered. Hence, the anger at «elite cultural feminists» and «postmodern neo-
marxists» who are considered threatening to the identity of conservative identitarians. Regard-
less of the actual threat (or even reality) such groups represent, the experience of having an 
enemy can be a quite potent drug.   
Important here are various counternarratives to the hegemonic narrative which one 
does not accept as one’s own. When asked why they voted for Trump, these voters have often 
answered that he is not «politically correct», and that he says «what everybody is thinking, but 
is too afraid to say»128. In other words, he functions as a door opener, a strategic vector that 
can change the political game in favour of people who do not feel that they are being listened 
to, and whose interests are bound up with race, religion and «family values». The relative im-
portance of these factors to factors such as «the economy» or other more sanitary social quest-
ions will depend on how one feels included in the reigning narrative. If one, for example, feels 
that one’s traditional position as a man in society is threatened because of more inclusive poli-
cies for transsexuals, then one may be more easily swayed to vote for a candidate that argues 
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against those inclusive policies, more than one will reward someone for their sound stance on 
taxation. As the quotations from the Trump voters suggest, the further a stated policy goal is 
from the perceived homogenous realm, the more one will reward the candidate for «having 
the balls» to stand for it. In this regard, Trump’s scandalous behaviour and lewd comments 
will not be seen as a drawback. On the contrary, he will be rewarded for them, because they 
are testament to his authenticity as a candidate for the silent majority at the outside of civility. 
In a backlash against civil discourse, incivility becomes an asset. 
In such an atmosphere, the rhetorics of the opposition becomes quite important, and 
for that reason Hilary Clinton’s words about the «deplorables» must have been quite disheart-
ening for anyone opposed to Trump’s presidency. There is a Nietzschean point to be made 
here in that those who feel left out by the current dominant discourse will feel resentment if 
representatives of the mainstream political class belittle their social situation and experience 
of loss. The Trump supporters must be conceded a point if they claim that Clinton’s «basket 
of deplorables» echoed the political establishment of the USA, and politicians’ contempt of 
the people they are supposed to represent is in itself not a sign of a healthy democracy. Far 
from stopping racism and sexism, Clinton gave the followers of Trump a suitable anchorage 
for collective identity formation. Deplorability became a sign of infamy that could be turned 
to the opposite after the deplorables had had their revenge. «Wear it as a badge of pride», as 
Steve Bannon said. With Trump, there was finally a person who could turn the basket cases’ 
deplorability into glory, and that was a basis for his pastoral power.  
The ressentiment such contempt feeds has, as Nietzsche explained, a strong potential 
for hatred, which along with encouragement from likeminded culture warriors will strengthen 
them in their resolve to fight the system («drain the swamp»). At its roots, one might argue 
that such an attitude is planted in healthy opposition. Protest against a political system that 
does not represent the brunt of the members of the polity is a sign of political vigour. It gets 
problematic when this desire for change is channeled through identitarian conduits rather than 
through revolutionary discourse. In a political culture which emphasizes such virtues as aspir-
ation, ambition and grit, members of relatively privileged groups (white, straight males) will 
probably not be swayed by promises of social harmony and equality, especially if such har-
mony comes at their expence. One does not (is not even supposed to want) to get along, one 
wants to get ahead, and in an effort to protect valued dimensions of one’s social status a white 
womanizer opposed to the current credo of political correctness will be a perfect conduit for 
discontent. «Perhaps some of his mana will rub off on me».                 
These are mechanisms closely tied up with the sort of social contagion Bataille writes 
about in his book Eroticism. A yawn makes us yawn, for example129. The presence of signs of 
what we might call other people’s life worlds has a contagious effect. We are bound up toget-
her as human beings and our experience as humans compels us to relate. In that regard, the 
degraded situation of the low prostitute who lives side by side with taboo may provoke dis-
gust precisely because she lives so close to the heterogenous realm. She is regarded as lower 
than an animal in dignity, which places her at a distance from the community of human per-
sons, and still, as we shall see, her function as prostitute places her in the center of the system 
that excludes her. Like other deviants, the prostitute helps defining the capitalist system by 
virtue of her very situation as a social outcast.  
 
8. On the Margins 
 
I ended the last section with some thoughts about social contagion, which is what this 
section will have as its focus. Given a social hierarchy, there will be individuals one will try to 
associate with and people that one will shun, or exclude, based on these people’s positions in 
the social structure. There will be people with lower and higher status within a given commu-
nity and there will often be stereotypes associated with various groups dependent on their sta-
tus. This sort of social gravitation will have a tendency to cement social hierarchies, which in 
turn may affect the degree of personhood one attaches to an individual on the basis of his or 
her group affiliation. In this section I will explore the dynamics of group status within a polit-
ical community and possible ideas of contagion arising from those dynamics.     
As Bataille points out, the animal is not a thing in itself, but is considered as such whi-
le it is treated as mere means of production130. The same principle applies for human beings. 
There’s a difference in status between the capitalist who owns the means of production, and 
the workers who are dependent on selling their labour power to the capitalist in exchange for 
a set wage. This is not the same as a profit, which is the surplus value extracted by the capital-
ist from the productive function of an enterprise. We have here the classic tension between 
worker and capitalist posited by Marx, who in turn was inspired by Hegel’s master/slave dia-
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lectic. The basis for the relation between worker and capitalist is the contract, and the regulat-
ing power beneath the contract is monetary capital, which makes the social basis for the terms 
of the contract a capitalist one. The prostitute of Bataille’s narrative uses her own body as ac-
cess to necessary goods regulated by the capitalist system, which is comparable to, but some-
what different from the situation of other manual labourers who sell the product of their man-
ual labour and not themselves as such. The means of production used by the prostitute are not 
tools per se, but rather herself as corporal entity. 
Here one must ask oneself to what means the prostitute is used as a means of product-
ion, and the answer gives itself readily: The satisfaction of other human beings. As Foucault 
has explained, the entrepreneurial man defines himself through the production of his own sat-
isfaction, and he does this through consumption. The prostitute, then, is in this case the means 
through which the entrepreneurial man realizes himself as a rational agent in the neo-liberal 
social structure. Ironically, this function makes the prostitute eminently useful as a productive 
mechanism in the prevailing system. As we have seen, the homogenous realm is defined by 
production and, ultimately, use value. If the central standard of a given society is satisfaction, 
then the prostitute, as a provider of pleasure, satisfies her society’s fundamental use value. 
This makes the prostitute’s situation paradoxical. She is both, as an outcast and a carrier of 
low status, a member of a heterogenous group, while simultaneously, as a provider of the 
commonly accepted standard of value, a constitutive member of the homogenous society. As 
an objectified means to other people’s satisfaction, she functions as a sort of focal point of 
capitalist logic. In a Hegelian turn of phrase, the prostitue can be said to represent the «truth» 
of neo-liberal society, this kind of system’s dirty secret. 
The function of the prostitute qua prostitute is to provide pleasure to her clients, to 
provide the condition for the entrepreneurial man’s self-realization through satisfaction. This 
makes her social function central to the neo-liberal society. This is not to say that prostitution 
is not compatible with other models of society. If that were the case, there would not be any 
prostitution in the USSR, which indeed there was. I would argue, though, that prostitution as a 
social function is more representative of neo-liberalism than of communism, or even of class-
ic liberalism. In liberalism, the fundamental point is to make a social space apart from both 
politics and capital. In neo-liberalism on the other hand, the function of the state is to serve 
the rule of capital, that is, to make it so that the logic of social interaction follows the ratio of 
capital. This logic is particularly relevant to the prostitute, who not only has to sell her labour 
power, like other workers, but she is forced to sell access to herself as a means of exchange. If 
the chief is a liminal figure on the top of society, the prostitute is a liminal figure on society’s 
bottom, and is associated with contagion of a different kind.  
The prostitute is conscious of her status beneath the dignity of ordinary people, closer 
to the status of an animal, and that has an impact on her behaviour. She knows that she has 
fallen outside of what one might call «decent» or «civilized» society, so she no longer strictly 
observes the taboos that serve to regulate that society. This provokes disgust in other people, 
who distance themselves from «that kind of woman» through expressions such as that a per-
son is going to «snuff it»131. The outcast is here excluded from the civilized community of 
persons. She is reduced to what Agamben called a pure zoé, a bare life on the margin between 
humanity and thinghood, as opposed to the qualified life of the citizen, called bios. As zoé the 
prostitute is considered expendable by the rest of the political community. Through a lot of 
such small acts society stays hierarchically stratified between civilized men and the dregs of 
society, with an aura of bad air and damnation around the outcast. 
Douglas helps us understand how this mechanism works throughout society. «Danger 
lies in transitional states», she says, because in those states the situation is undefinable132. A 
person who must pass from one state to another is in danger, and emanates danger to others. 
The classic case here is the passage from childhood to adulthood and other initiation rites. 
One must die from one’s old life so that one may be reborn to a new life in another group, 
preferably one with more status and more responsibility. Both inclusion in the community and 
personal status within it are thus confirmed through temporary exclusion. This is not only a 
feature of primitive societies, but a basic mechanism for community as such. The group is 
confirmed through external negativity. During the ritual the initiate temporarily becomes an 
outcast, a status that signifies death. They are licensed to waylay, steal and rape, which is 
classic anti-social behaviour associated with savagery. A clear distinction between civilization 
and savagery, form and non-form is continually established, where people are variously situ-
ated according to the patterns of the relevant social structure133. We see here the relevance of 
characteristics bestowed on colonial subjects by imperialist powers. If one can convince set-
tlers, and preferably natives, of the association between natives and savagery, policies of div-
ide and rule will be that much easier to execute, and proximity to stigmatized individuals can 
even be considered dangerous. 
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In a class society such fear of transition can be equally salient. Class journeys can hap-
pen upwards or downwards, and the people one surrounds oneself with largely determine 
what kind of journey it will be. Distinguishing high status from low status people can there-
fore be quite important for one’s life prospects, especially in a rigidly stratified society. For 
this reason, in a society with a sharp colour line, it can sort of make sense for a person on the 
bottom of the social ladder to cling to a racist demagogue belonging to a high status group. 
For the same reason, it can make sense for a person on the middle rung of society to exagga-
rate this effect, as Jones exemplifies in Chavs.                                 
A problem that Jones emphasizes is how working class people are presented in the 
media, often by pundits who consider themselves liberal leftists. The tension that is likely to 
run through this class because of the aforementioned factors is exaggarated by people who 
have a vested interest in portraying themselves as morally superiour, particularly in contrast to 
the «vile plebs». The characteristics attributed to the demonized working class are tellingly 
close to those attributed to racially oppressed people by intellectuals with a vested interest in 
racism. Focus is diverted away from social and economic issues towards the moral failings of 
people presented as a race-obsessed, hard-drinking rump, always a step away from anarchy. 
He cites columnist Janet Daley, characterizing the British working class as «self-loathing», 
«self-destructive» and lacking in «civic culture»134. These are characteristics similar to those 
directed against black people struggling to get by in an American society marked by cumulat-
ive advantages for white people. Also, following Douglas’ description of the structure of init-
iation rites, as well as the descriptions of imperialist rhetorics directed against colonized peo-
ples, one sees a clear paralell between the working class people being singled out for moral 
condemnation and culturally alienated peoples associated with «the jungle».  
With Fanon’s account of interthnic rivalry in mind, one would expect to discover rang-
es of phobia within the working class itself, from middle managers and engineers down to the 
low prostitute in Bataille’s Eroticism. While people from these reviled groups are the most 
numerous, and the very people who make society function, it is important to associate them 
with stigma in order to keep them in their place. Given that the strategic situation is defined 
by markers such as socio-economic status and «race», it makes sense for each of the partici-
pant in the social field to demonstrate distance from the socially stigmatized groups and, cor-
respondingly, proximity to agents who represent «order» and «civilization». 
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Stating a straight forward line of identification from the higher to the lower rungs of 
society seems overly facile, however, and not very realistic. As we have seen from Bataille’s 
example of social contagion (and this also makes sense from Douglas’ elaborations on social 
patterns) we tend to associate most with people who are close to us. Our sense of identity is 
socially nested, but it begins with our experiences of ourselves, with a sort of narsissistic 
investment. Given any stratified society, one would probably do well to keep in mind Nietz-
sche’s model with fear and ressentiment one one side, and contempt and callousness on the 
other. Fear and ressentiment are directed against those at the top of the social hierarchy and 
contempt and callousness are directed against those at the bottom. It would make sense to gat-
her together against those on the top of the ladder, and equally to keep out those at the bottom. 
The perception of social contagion is contingent on social identity, so while there is a potenti-
al for strategies of divide and rule on the part of the powerful, there is also potential for solid-
arity among the disposessed. Individual strategies would also be expected. Given these vario-
us economies of fault, merit, money and status, and the need to associate oneself with one’s 
chosen peers (who are not necessarily above one in status), certain telltale signs would be est-
ablished, such that one’s general dress and demeanour, one’s habituation, function as markers 
of economic class as well as where one thinks one belongs in the social pattern or field.           
Foucault brings us closer to an understanding of such habituation, and how it becomes 
physically visible on the body of the person thus habituated. From the proud soldier to the 
subdued peasant, the bodies of a social field’s actors enter a political economy of utility, the 
goal of which is discipline. Discipline is here understood as a balance between increased apti-
tude or mastery of the body on the one hand, and the subjection of the same body on the other. 
The energy that results from increased mastery of the body becomes, through training, direct-
ed inwards and becomes a tool for the body’s own oppression. The various forms of training 
take place in schools, hospitals, armies and workshops135. It is clear that various forms of 
training, and thus various forms of conduct, take place in various forms of institutions, work-
places, social groups and stations. This bears directly on the formations of various in- and out-
groups, because it allows one more or less to recognize one’s peers. The way one moves one’s 
body says something important about which social group one belongs to. 
With this in mind, the youth gangs’ body language that Jones describes is interesting. 
He describes them as «loitering menacingly on street corners» and as displaying «anti-social 
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behaviour»136. Jones, of course, shows a rather sympathetic attitude towards these teenagers, 
stressing that they group together in order to stay away from trouble and in order to find a 
kind of solidarity that they will not find elsewhere. The point of interest here, though, is what 
this body language entails for the group displaying them. First, Jones is clearly on the right 
track in his emphasis on intragroup protection and peer solidarity. Taking into account the fact 
that poor people in impoverished areas are more likely to suffer from crime than is the case 
for people from middle or upper classes, and given that people from high-crime, low-income 
communities are not likely to be prioritized for police protection, it makes sense that they wo-
uld band together in order to protect themselves. In line with a Foucauldian framework, it also 
makes sense that together with such a social function, there will be a corresponding conduct.  
A social function and a corresponding normative framework are likely conducive to a 
certain kind of behaviour, which can be intentionally frightening both because of the felt need 
to protect oneself and one’s community, and the need to display such virtues that seem neces-
sary for the provision of such protection. Thus, social function and normative framework can 
give rise to a hierarchy of status that is more complex than mere differences in wealth, even if 
economic differences are important underlying causes conducive to such hierarchies to arise 
in the first place. If such hierarchies are pervasive in a given stratum of a given populace, that 
can lead to relatively stable behaviour associated with that stratum. This can in turn help ex-
plain how pinning differences in general social status and power on the personal characteris-
tics of individuals and cultures can stick and be considered valid truths. Thus, within the same 
polity, we have different «races» of the Foucauldian kind, and the reigning discourse on aspir-
ation and moral failure can be regarded as a weapon of domination over the people living in 
poverty. With sufficient habituation, the cultural becomes natural, and the victims of class 
oppression become pathologized as «dangerous individuals».  
Foucault makes this clear in Abnormal, when he writes that nineteenth century psychi-
atry gave rise to a sort of racism through the theory of hereditary degeneracy. The goal to 
which psychiatry is used as a means here is to protect society from internal anomalies that 
may pose a danger to it137. The dangerous individual becomes an epidemiological challenge, a 
possible carrier of either disease or «fitness». The fear of contagion from individuals perceiv-
ed to be dangerous, and its link to visible features loaded with phantasmic significance, sugg-
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ests that health, status and hierarchies of various sorts of capital tend to cement social distance 
between individuals through affective investment in preservation of self.  
It seems prudent also to see such a shift in light of Bataille’s notions of homogeneity 
and heterogeneity. The degenerate individual can be considered an individual on the margin, 
an individual that does not entirely fit into the present paradigm (in a Khunian sense). That 
which one cannot control, or what does not seem immediately useful, here becomes a threat to 
order, and the populace must therefore be protected against these individuals. As we have also 
seen, the people who belong to the heterogenous realm correspond roughly to Foucault’s two 
political monsters, that is either the king, who benefits from the prevailing order, and can be 
seen as somehow above the law, or it can mean the destitute people who are outcasts of their 
own societies, and from whom one therefore may fear revolutionary violence. What is threat-
ened is not merely the normative order of society, but a person challenges through heterogen-
eity the fundamental social contract that ensures the continuation and prosperity of the social 
body. The heterogenous, as Bataille has explained, is that which refuses to assimilate to the 
homogenous system based on contractual relations and useful productivity. Where Bataille 
characterizes human nature as that in us which is geared to specific ends in work and makes 
things of us at the expense of sexual exuberance, animal nature is, in contrast, presented as 
sexual exuberance. Animal nature is that which prevents us from being reduced to things138. 
That which lives for itself rather than as an act of social service is thus closer to the beast. As 
Deleuze and Guattari would say, animal nature is manifest in the form of libido. 
This helps us understand why the child masturbator is singled out as a classic figure of 
deviance in Foucault’s framework. If the human community is based on production, and if the 
productive forces are tied to libido, as we see in Bataille, the act of masturbation lurks as a 
beastly threat to human civilization. The human person is always potentially animal, never en-
tirely reducible to a productive member of the polis. Foucault claims, in The Care of the Self 
that the masturbator was considered by Christian Western literature to be the prototype of un-
natural pleasure, invented to break loose from the limits set for humanity139. Masturbation can 
then be considered a form of excess that indicates a universal potential for monstrosity, given 
the framework presented in Abnormal. 
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At this point the notion of instinct seems relevant. Foucault claims that illness has 
been construed as a bad setup in the structures that ensures that instincts are made to function 
«normally»140. Furthermore, there is a fiction of total illness in texts written by anti-masturb-
ation campaigners, to the effect that there seems to be an irresistable drive on the side of the 
masturbator, causing him to «[satisfy] the call of nature wherever he happened to be», accom-
panied with a nauseating odour and several other signs of illness, as well as a presence of de-
ath141. Death, as we have seen, is a concept often associated with the realm at the Outside of 
civilization. Face to face with the potential masturbator, one encounters the potential demise 
of civilization from within. It seems that there is a paranoia in the reigning logos stemming 
from the fact that there is a realm outside it, that is accessible to every person through the Dio-
nysian part of their psyche. Earlier in Abnormal, Foucault explains that the very development 
of instinct as concept began as an explanation of motiveless crimes. Once again, what we are 
dealing with is an irresistable drive, outside the domain of intelligence, pushing the person af-
fected by it to acts of madness. As this is a physical condition, rather than a rational mechan-
ism, it is tied to an evolutionist discourse, feeding into the discourse of eugenics142.  
We are dealing with a link between a lack of correct training, coupled with an instinct 
that can be either constructive or destructive, in a civilizatory framework. Individuals that are 
not successfully assimilated into the human community are not entirely to be trusted, always a 
bit dangerous. This, however, is a danger that affects all of us. As the practice of masturbation 
is so generally widespread there will always potentially be a heterogenous element in every 
human being. The potential danger associated with the stranger is at the same time, though to 
a lesser degree, a danger that is permanently present within one’s own community. Hence, the 
means of correct training become even more important. Presumably, there will also be a per-
ceived need to separate decadent from healthy individuals. We get a biopolitics, but also what 
Achille Mbembe calls a «necropolitics». Mbembe defines this notion as the power to decide 
who matters and who does not, who is disposible and who is not143. For Mbembe, the general-
ized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and 
populations are part and parcel of the modern state144.  
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9. The Perils of Dependency 
 
Various sorts of capital give rise to various forms of normalization and exclusion. In 
this section I will explore the nature of the state as a political body, people’s roles within that 
state and how the reliance on various social roles may lead to social hierarchies, stereotypes 
based on these social roles and hierarchies and possible mechanisms of violence and exclusi-
on arising from these social frameworks. I will start with an idea of the state presented by the 
postcolonial theorist Achille Mbembe, examine class relations relevant to relations of produc-
tion, and then move on to explore how social capital based on gender roles can be conducive 
to forms of oppression and exclusion similar to those relevant to the precarious worker. I will 
focus particularly on homophobia as a product of hierarchized gender relations and on how 
this problem can be aggravated by an overly competitive society. I will also focus on the way 
a society’s or group’s normative framework can lead to mechanisms of normalization that not 
only tends to exclude, but also to discipline the society’s members in patterns of paranoia. 
There are various ways of imagining the origin of the state. One theory that is held by 
Achille Mbembe (and that also makes sense within a basically Foucauldian framework) is that 
the state is founded on an act of violence. Sovereignty can here be interpreted as the right to 
kill, which is presented as the basis for the Sovereign’s power in The Will to Knowledge. This 
hypothesis makes sense in light of the dichotomy between the European civilizers and their 
barbarian opponents. Civilization must be protected for the good of all, even if it may cost a 
couple of lives. The modern state is always watchful for the barbarians at the gates and pos-
sible traitors within. The ultimate counter-topos to the modern state is the colony, where the 
laws that govern civilized societies no longer apply, where war and disorder, internal and ex-
ternal figures of the political stand side by side or alternate with each other145. The colony is 
the heterogenous nature outside order and civilization. The colony itself is strictly delinated in 
a way reminiscent of Foucault’s plague ridden town. The township is where «those people» 
live: The colonized subjects, the lepers of modernity146.  
The township is, however, for that very reason a necessary precondition for the order 
governing the state. According to Agamben, the rule has no other way to constitute itself as 
such than to take its exception into account. By constituting the sphere of the rule, one simul-
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taneously establishes the state of exception, which Agamben defines as the margin between 
the state of order and utter chaos147. The state of order exists at the mercy of the realm of cha-
os, and can therefore not exist other than through a violation of that realm. Judith Butler has 
pointed out that the supposed lawlessness of the situation before the institution of the law can 
function as a self-justification of a repressive or subordinating law148. Butler made the point in 
the context of gender and sexuality, but it is clearly applicable to the colony, especially given 
the alleged responsibility to «civilize the natives».      
Mbembe claims that the fear of the Other as a mortal threat and absolute danger, who-
se destruction would strengthen my potential to life and security is inherent in early and late 
modernity. Thence comes the need to subordinate everything to impersonal logic and instru-
mental rationality. Mechanization and racial stereotypes contribute to a development where 
the working classes and the «stateless people» of the industrial world are conflated with the 
savages of the colonies. There is, then, a perception of both the working class and the colon-
ized subjects as somehow subhuman. As the colonized subject and the industrial labourer are 
reduced to units of commerce, their humanity is dissolved to the point of being a thing in the 
master’s possession149. The master gains sovereignty over them, which entails a sort of legal 
dependency. As their status shifts from person to thing, existing at the mercy of a person with 
ultimate authority over their life condition, they go from being atutonomous to being dispos-
able. This is the status that Agamben calls homo sacer150. 
Since we have already dealt with Bataille’s notions of homogeneity, heterogeneity and 
sacredness, the time seems apt to explain Agamben’s homo sacer in a little more detail. Homo 
sacer is a figure in old Roman law, and is described as someone who can be murdered with 
impunity, but cannot be sacrificed151. He cannot be sacrificed because he is defined as sacred, 
which also implies that he is condemned. Drawing on Bataille (who had in common with Ag-
amben that he was influenced by Durkheim and Mauss), we know that defining someone as 
sacred already is to place them outside of homogeneity, thus outside the civilized, productive 
realm. According to Agamben, sacredness is an ambivalent term, in that it implies respect as 
well as disgust, awe as well as fear152. It is clear that we are dealing with a phenomenon simi-
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lar to Foucault’s monstrosity, which on one hand is represented by the king and on the other 
hand with the people in revolt. The king is here constitutive of the homogenous order and fe-
ared because of his power as tyrant. That is clearly not the case with precarious workers or co-
lonized subjects, who are feared or despised because they represent the dirty end of society’s 
stick. Hence a fear of contagion, as well as chaos and violence as opposite to order. The homi-
nes sacri live «in a close symbiosis with death, but still not in the world of the deceased»153. 
That is, they find themselves on the margins of society, always in danger of being cast out 
into the great unknown realm on the Outside of civilized order. 
The status as thing, and as means of production is something that is recognizable from 
Bataille’s work. It is by subjection to the system instituted by the master that the slave enters 
the homogenous realm. The slave does not live for himself, but for another person who has ta-
ken ownership over his person. The remaining potential for self-worth remaining in the slave 
is seen as something bestial because it remains outside the homogenous realm. The remaining 
energy that is still regarded as self-affirmatory is, according to Bataille, bound up with sexual 
exuberance, and therefore a man’s innermost pride is tied to his virility154. In order to bring 
the worker in line with the homogenous sphere of production this energy needs to be tamed, 
so there is a potential source of conflict in this tension. The master is the one who constitutes 
the law, but who, as owner, stands outside it. In line with a Foucauldian approach, this master 
will not be an individual capitalist, but rather the neo-liberal framework itself, that sets the 
rules for society that all must follow. Cash is now king, and money knows no master. There 
are, however, individuals who stand closer to the source of power than others, and who stand 
to gain from the neo-liberal system. These people will, more than poor and powerless people, 
have the privilege of shaping the rules in accordance with the neo-liberal credo.   
The relationship between the master and the slave is certainly not characterized by any 
sort of equality, but rather takes the shape we know from Hegel’s dialectic, where the slave, 
as we see, becomes a «thing» for the master. The more the worker remains his own person, 
the more he is seen as feral and dangerous. The more he is subdued, the less pleasure the mas-
ter is able to take in the resultant obedience. Any genuine relationship based on mutual recog-
nition is thus rendered impossible. Breaking this bond is dangerous by definition, because out-
side the sphere of the law, of homogeneity, there is the great Outside associated with chaos 
and death. In such a setup, a set of presumptions are made. One such presumption is that the 
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main area of conflict in the class struggle is that between the industrial worker and the (bour-
gois) manager. This is a conflict that has certainly changed since Marx’s time, but which is 
still with us culturally. Given Bataille’s masculinist bias, we are here primarily thinking about 
a male worker who depends on his job not only for his own good, but in order to support his 
family, as well. In Marx’s case, it must be said that he did write about the subjugation of wo-
men and about the violence of child labour. One might make the case that Marx theorized on 
intersectionality before it became commonly acknowledged, but in his revolutionary rhetorics, 
there are aspects that may be conducive to masculine bias and heteronormativity. 
Particularly the emphasis on war between classes may contribute to biased thinking of 
the sort relevant here. We know from Plato’s Republic that martial valour was particularly 
cherished in the old polis and that this sort of valour was particularly associated with the male 
gender. Women were supposed to stay at home and take care of children and the household, 
which were important tasks, to be sure, but not really as highly prized as political oratory or 
soldiery, which were thought of as male domains. As Foucault emphasizes, the normative di-
vision between the active male and the passive female has been deeply ingrained in Western 
culture up to our times155, and sexual normativity has revolved around a passive and receiving 
part associated with femininity, and an active and executing part associated with masculini-
ty156. Agency is here associated with the second part, which in turn is relevant to patterns of 
dominance and therefore martial valour. So when Marx, for example speaks about the «re-
serve army of labour», this may be efficient as a call to arms in the struggle between labour 
and capital, but it is also liable to strengthen the imagined bond between the worker and the 
male gender as imagined symbolic tropes.  
The link between the discourse of war and machismo may lend itself not only to male 
bias, but also possibly to homophobia. The American anthropologist Philippe Bourgois points 
to mechanisms of machismo and homophobia in an East Harlem gang with whom he has been 
living as part of his work. He has himself been suspected of not being heterosexual because of 
his parlance and behaviour157. This is not a totally harmless belief in this context, because 
LGBT people are generally not trusted or respected in this particular community. In fact, it’s 
worse than that, as people whose sexual orientations do not correspond sufficiently with reig-
ning gender norms are inordinately exposed to violence. As a gang member with the pseudo-
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nym Caesar puts it: «And if you’re a new nigga’ and you’re a fag and you like it […] they 
take your ass and stuff it with some mad concrete»158. Here we see the dynamics of racism 
and homophobia at work in an immigrant community in New York. The social dynamics in 
East Harlem are such that Puerto Ricans define themselves in opposition to the relatively do-
minant whites and the relatively stigmatized blacks, which has various and somewhat contra-
dictory consequences for Puerto Rican street culture in East Harlem.  
Pierre Bourdieu noted something similar about the French working class, where oppo-
sition to the bourgeoisie meets sexual morality159. In classic Greek thinking, the problem pro-
per to sexual morality was not the direction of attraction, but one’s attitude to pleasure160. If 
one had a passive (effeminate) attitude to pleasure (such as in Caesar’s scenario), one could 
not be counted upon to govern oneself properly, which may be considered a liability in the 
context of class struggle. The trappings of capital may be tempting. Given more contemporary 
stereotypes about sexuality, the fear of insufficient self-control tied to ideas of femininity may 
lead to homophobia. One should therefore be wary not only of the abstractions that take place 
at the top of the social hierarchy, but also at the bottom rungs. 
The social codes dominating a given social sphere can be conducive not only to social 
ostracism, but also potentially to physical violence. Caesar’s outburst about the American 
prison system is suggestive, but certainly not unique. As has already been mentioned, there 
seems to have been a nasty current of homophobia in the French working class. Homophobia 
as such, however, is clearly not exclusively a working class phenomenon. In «The «faggot 
clause»», Michele Rene Gregory makes clear that there is a strong culture of homophobia in 
white collar corporate culture, as well. The problem, then, is not unrelated to class, but seems 
to be more tied up with machismo in general. There is, as Gregory sees it, a strong link in the 
corporate imaginary between machismo, competitiveness and dominance that privileges hete-
rosexual men at the expense of women and gay men161. Gregory does not mention lesbian wo-
men, but according to Foucault, «it was better for a woman to take the place of a man than it 
is for a man to stoop to the level of women»162, so it seems safe to assume that lesbians take 
part in the general economy of gender. It is important to note here also that since the focus of 
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sexual discourse in the West has been on the male agent, women were long thought not to 
have any agency in this area, such that the lesbian woman has been a non-entity in this para-
digm. This is dangerous for at least two reasons. One is that denial of identity in itself is a sort 
of violent exclusion, another is that it might make the man believe that the lesbian identity 
exists for his own enticement.  
What goes as being explicitly «gay» in Gregory’s account are particularly open emot-
ionality, aestehetic body movements and a lack of perceived toughness163, which again has ro-
ots in ancient Greece where masculinity was associated with rationality as opposed to emot-
ionality, and what one can call a will to dominance. The aesthetic features of «gay» gestures 
may also signify readiness to function as an object of pleasure, that to the minds of the ancient 
Greeks made the beloved take the place of a woman164. According to the Greeks, such behavi-
our was a breach of the natural order165, and was therefore taboo. Such supposedly feminine 
characteristics were associated with emotionality, irrationality and the body, and hence indica-
ted a lack of «maturity». These stereotypes are reminiscent of the racist tropes Fanon writes 
about, so the dynamics that lead to racist violence and oppression may also be relevant to 
sexually determined violence and oppression.  
Besides showing homophobia to be a persistent problem in corporate culture, Grego-
ry’s research also demonstrates sexuality and gender as performative factors, having to do 
with culture at least as much as nature. He did not mention physical violence so much as a 
part of corporate culture, but these are powerful actors. As Hannah Arendt reminded us, «po-
wer and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent»166. The 
possible absence of physical violence in this sector does not necessarily show that there is less 
homophobia there. It might just mean that the «softer» threat of power is more potent, so there 
will be less use for fists. As with racism, it might be the case that people from disadvantaged 
groups feel that they have more to lose and are therefore more likely to lash out. One would in 
any case expect people within a culture dominated by normative heterosexuality to avoid be-
haviour that may be perceived as «gay», in an effort to steer away from the judgement of what 
Foucault called the «normalizing gaze». 
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As Mbembe has argued, the execution of errors in a social machinery is normally seen 
as something to be avoided. The normalizing gaze works as a penal mechanism to reduce the 
amount of errors appearing in this machinery through a system of penalties and rewards167. In 
Foucault’s narrative, the emphasis is on reward, because the system is best served if it is aided 
by trust and encouragement. As such, the normalizing gaze fulfills a disciplinary function that 
serves to make the members of society conduct themselves according to the rules regulating 
this society. The factors being regulated in this way revolve around the axes of time, activity, 
behaviour, speech, body and sexuality. Neither of these factors should be understood as objec-
tive measures, but are given meaning by being situated within a system of values and norms. 
Those who do not measure up to the norms established by the code of conduct, or who deviate 
from it, stand in risk of punishment. The function of punishment is here to correct deviance. 
Those who break rank either by voluntary or involuntary failure must be taught not to repeat 
the committed offence. Foucault claims that this is done through additional exercise, but one 
might expect, in other contexts, that the same lesson might be conveyed through social ostra-
cism or through physical violence. Interestingly, given Foucault’s schema in Discipline and 
Punish, where the panopticon of the prison is generalized to function as an apparatus of con-
trol in society at large, we can see some similarities between the normalizing gaze affecting 
the gay person and the colonial system imposed upon the colonized subject. 
On the basis of the normalizing gaze, a field of distinctions is set up, such as the dis-
tinction between good and evil. There is a sort of moral economy of merit and fault set up by 
this mechanism, which in turn makes it possible to quantify the amount of good and evil in 
each person. Individuals are thus measured according to merit, and bear visible marks that 
convey information about where people are positioned in this moral hierarchy. Foucault lists 
four ranks from «very good» to «bad», and adds that there was for a time a fifth class, «the 
shameful» who would always be separated from the others and be dressed in sackcloth. In this 
group we recognize the untouchables in Bataille’s account, such that the four ranks can also 
be seen as standing on an axis from fully integrated in the homogenous realm to those con-
demned to dwell in a separate heterogenous realm, apart from the others and deprived of the 
solidarity of the group. Those who want to partake in the community of their fellow human 
beings are forced to partake in the moral economy of merit and fault and to abide by the rules 
that govern the flock. Those who fail to live up to the standards are not considered merely de-
ficient, as if that wasn’t bad enough, but evil, with all that entails of righteousness and moral 
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scorn. Deviance is conceived as a betrayal of the larger whole that protects the individual as 
well as the group, and it gives the flock a right to punish.  
Butler elaborates on that theme as she claims that failure to perform their gender right 
is liable to attract the flock’s scorn. As gender is a collective fiction, it depends on an econo-
my of reward and punishment in order to function, or even to exist168. The ritual of gender 
reinforces itself continually through stylized performance and gets its own reality from the 
patterened behaviour of human beings. Those who fail to comply in such a display are seen as 
anomalies in the homogenous order and are to that extent shunned. The status of outcast imp-
lies both a lowering of status and increased exposure to violence because community memb-
ers tend to protect the «natural» homogenous order, the boundaries of which are associated 
with chaos and death169. It is likely that the stigmatized person will also condemn the hetero-
genous aspects of his own psyche, possibly leading to self-contempt and self-harm. We all 
internalize norms and values proper to our respective communities. In the case of stigmatized 
persons, norms that may not fit them as human beings may drive them to overperformance on 
a toxic cocktail of paranoia and self-loathing in an effort to «prove themselves». As Foucault 
puts it, «the soul is the prison of the body»170. The external marks born by the subjects vario-
usly situated in this moral economy also suggest that the rank orders are tied to more tangible 
benefits, which has explanatory value for the «criminal pauper» phantasm discussed in chap-
ter 5. Like the panopticon, the normalizing gaze homogenizes at the same time that it indivi-
dualizes. It disciplines the flock to move in the same direction at the same time that it places 
its individual members at different steps of the hierarchical ladder through the use of external 
marks of allegiance.    
In a homophobic community, being marked as «gay» sets one down one notch in the 
moral pecking order regulated by the normalizing gaze. One has to ask oneself why that is. 
Most of the people applying the «faggot clause» either as an attack or as self-defense, were 
men, but women, too, can sometimes use the clause. We seem, then, to be dealing with a sort 
of gendered hierarchy, where straight men are on top, based on their supposed toughness and 
rationality, whereas women and homosexuals are placed in a complex dynamic of merits and 
faults beneath them. This seems to have quite a bit in common with the dynamics of racism 
discussed above. W. Allen is onto something similar in the second volume of The Invention of 
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the White Race, where he claims that an intermediate stratum of people of colour was install-
ed between the status of white and black in order to prevent a collective challenge from the 
ranks of workers towards the prevailing system of bond-labour171. Expanding from this, one 
might perhaps make the semi-Lacanian argument that a bank account serves the symbolic fun-
ction of a phallus in a capitalist economy, and that this symbolic function may serve as a locus 
for interpretation of power dynamics on the intersection between hierarchies of class and gen-
der. This would influence the development of phantasms, as well, with stereotypes that share 
some particular features pertaining to social power. Where Fanon theorized about the «Negro 
myth» in the case of people with dark skin, it might make sense to speak of a «faggot myth» 
in the case of non-heterosexual people. As the connotations of race go beyond mere skin col-
our, one would expect the connotations of sexuality to go beyond mere sexual attraction. 
Where black people in the colonies were subjugated by white imperialists, it makes sense to 
look for the causes of homophobia and heterosexual bias in a nexus of power centered around 
male privilege. 
 
10. Sex & Violence 
 
Racism has been used by owners of capital to foment divisions between white and 
black workers. Giving white workers certain privileges has tended to create feelings of sup-
eriority through a «screen of racial contempt». The subjugation of women has been a feature 
of Western societies for just as long. Similar to racist discourse, women have been thought 
less intelligent than men, less stable and more prone to emotional outbursts. From ancient 
times, men have been considered more in tune with rationality, and with virtues that were 
valued in the ancient polis, such as science and martial valour. In order for such a story to 
seem plausible, there had to be a difference between the sexes that seemed to call for the do-
mesticity of women. As we have seen earlier in this thesis, this difference was largely tied to 
women’s pregnancy. In this section, I will explore the social economy of gender, and I will 
explore the commonalities between sexism, racism and classism.  
Women were needed to create offspring, who in their turn could take care of the fami-
ly inheritance. In Undoing Gender, Judith Butler mentions the child as an eroticized site of 
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cultural reproduction. She claims that the child affirms the pure transmission of culture thro-
ugh a patrilinear system such that heterosexuality and monolithic culture support each other in 
a self-affirming loop172. Foucault makes an argument in The Use of Pleasure that fits well 
with Butler’s theory. He argues that people through the act of procreation try to take part in a 
sort of immortality by having children that will prolong their parents linage after they as indi-
viduals die173. The idea of attempted immortality makes it easier to see how regulations on 
child birth can lead to sexual normativity and general biopolitics, and possibly also help us 
make sense of racism as well as homophobia. Immortality suggests not only a will to create 
new life that lasts long into the future, but also the will to hold on to something old in this 
new life. Such a project can possibly lead to ideas about sexual duty and genetic purity.  
In times of globalization and disputed identities, the fundamental structures beneath 
monolithic cultures are not necessarily weakened. The opposite can be the case, because of 
the deepseated need for community that characterizes the human creature. In Gender Trouble, 
Butler informs us that women have also been used as objects of exchange between patriarchal 
clans, who interact on the basis of a repressed homosocial desire174. There is support for this 
notion in Foucault’s book The Care of the Self, where he ties practices of human transaction 
to patterns of Greek thinking revolving around the economy (oikos)175. If this is true, then, 
given Foucault’s account of the normalizing gaze, it seems fair to assume that homophobia 
may, at least in part, be based on a paranoiac hypervigilance based on anxiety for loss of 
status. Butler offers another interpretation, that may not stand in conflict with the first one. 
She believes that the interplay of various gay and lesbian identities within a framework of 
compulsory heterosexuality may destabilize the semiotic structures of gender176.  
The mediatory position of the women between the two men sending and receiving her 
implies a latent homosexuality beneath the regulatory heterosexuality that cannot be named, 
because that would upset the economy of marital exchange177. In that case it seems to be the 
structure of power itself that is at stake. The logic here will be similar to that of the normaliz-
ing gaze, which is certainly not contradictory to paranoia. It is, however, important to see that 
this paranoiac schema holds a liberatory potential. Reappropriation and reconfiguration of op-
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pressive languages may then be said to play an emancipatory role that mere denial of the same 
system cannot fulfill. It is interesting to observe that Mbembe makes a similar point in the 
case of postcolonial societies, where humour is used to resituate and reconfigure the semantic 
languages of power178.  
There is, however, another side to this setup. As Klaus Theweleit has pointed out, the 
role of the woman as a placeholder of social status and as means of exchange makes her a 
central locus for social aspiration to the effect that phantasmatic investment in women from 
the upper classes may turn revolutionary potency into ambition of a more conservative kind 
«through the back door», as it were179. The fetishization of the domesticated woman may thus 
turn revolutionary discourse into its opposite, in a way that is reminiscent of the chief. This 
does seem to open up a space of particularly female agency to the effect that even in their 
subordinate position thrust upon them by patriarchy it would be wrong to consider women in 
such systems to be entirely powerless. The best portrayal of this feminine power is probably 
given by Shakespeare through the character of Lady Macbeth. Social power of this kind is not 
the same as equality between the sexes, and may even be a hindrance to such equality because 
it gives women a stake in the game of patriarchy. At the same time that it makes room for var-
ious forms of power, the system also prepares the ground for various forms of goals, tensions 
and resistances that may stand in internal conflict.  
Along with the homosocial dimension, the desire of men to be associated with each 
other through the marriage of respective offspring may have been part of an effort to strengt-
hen the race by acquisition of the desired qualities one sees in the other’s land. The Nazi slo-
gan Blut und Boden may be understood as an explication of such a regulatory heterosexist 
economy. It seems that racism and patriarchy share certain qualities that are also related to 
what Foucault has called the «splendor» of the state. The blood and the soil go together in this 
framework, and it must be regulated by strict gender roles, as well as racial purity, in order to 
keep the national project alive. There will be a homosocial dimension to this project loaded 
with sexual dimensions that cannot be spoken for fear of degeneracy. Actual lived-out homo-
sexual desires can be experienced as a threat to the national project. Such leanings may be 
looked upon as a danger to the established order and a potential weakening of homogenous 
civilization and must therefore be strongly discouraged. We have then a basis for a biopolitics 
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of sexuality that is similar to the biopolitics of race. Also similar to racism, it is clear that we 
may be dealing with a fear of contagion here, as well. 
According to patriarchal mythology, such as the one behind the «faggot myth» de-
scribed by Gregory, women and gay men are more prone to emotional outbursts than is the 
case with straight men. For the sake of efficiency, then, the power to make decisions should 
be granted to heterosexual men, who are to be thought of as utility maximizing «rational ag-
ents». Emotions are dangerous because they seem to imply a lack of control. In a social con-
text, however, the lack of passion may be at least as dangerous, because it simultaneously en-
tails a lack of compassion. In the colony, this was a test of manhood and virility. If one could 
display an absence of compassion in the presence of suffering one was regarded a splendid re-
presentative of one’s race180. As both colonizer and colonized were human beings, and hum-
ans are fundamentally social beings, racial myths about the colonized people’s resistance to 
pain must surely have helped facilitate this violent test of manhood.  
According to the assumptions built into patriarchal mythology, traditionally masculine 
men are thought to be the only people responsible enough to take charge and make decisions. 
Butler claims that developments in cell biology build on the assumption that the male sex de-
notes activity and presence, whereas the female sex denotes passivity and absence. If that is 
so, the culturally constructed male/ female dichotomy has influenced, and is lent credence by, 
scientific work such that prescribed gender roles may seem more natural than would be the 
case in the case of different scientific trajectories. She considers this an affirmation of the 
continuing applicability of a Foucauldian critique181. Certainly, we see the contours of a pow-
er/knowledge critique here, as well as an epistemological framework built for domination of 
one sex over another, and strictly prescribed gender roles to maintain this domination. These 
are features that sexism shares with racism, as we have seen in the case of Rwanda. Both ra-
cism and sexism build on tropes which are largely fictitious, and they depend on the assent of 
subjugated people in order to continue to function. For this reason one would expect both ide-
ologies to come with a degree of paranoia and an exaggarated need of control.   
Elizabeth Grosz links this need, and its corresponding paranoia, to a primary violence 
where the man tries to repress the debt he and his society stand in to the maternal body. One 
could add to this that if a central source of men’s social power is rationality as opposed to em-
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otion, this necessitates a repression of their own personalities as well, such that the myth of 
patriarchy implies a denial of male as well as female subjectivity. Expanding from this, one 
could also argue that homophobia may entail a paranoid vigilance over the parts of one’s own 
psyche that corresponds with the «faggot myth», regardless of sexual preference, along with a 
corresponding fear of contagion. This double repression, which one must suppose is given 
additional force through processes of normalization, results in phantasmatic and paranoid pro-
jections that erase the feminine basis of society through the superimposition of masculine 
significatory phantasms182. As with the foundation of the state in Mbembe’s narrative, we see 
here a primary violence that establishes a civilizatory order, from which further kinds of viol-
ence arise. We can derive from Grosz’s analysis a basic similarity between racism, classism 
and sexism, which allows for a critique of the violence inherent to all these systems. This also 
helps us understand how subjugated groups can come to invest their identities in the interplay 
of various social hierarchies and develop strategies according to an interplay of social forces. 
This can further explain developments of hatred and violence as factors arising from the com-
petition between various hierarchical orders.    
Grosz’s description of world building on the basis of an erasure of bodies, and the 
instrumentalization of human lives is particularly interesting because it shares some features 
with Mbembe’s theories about the colony. The situation of women in a patriarchal society is 
both a crucial part of the interiority of the social system it supports, but also, somehow, on the 
outside of that system because of the violent subjugation that women are exposed to. Women 
are here supposed to be pillars of support without agency, bodies without minds. In that reg-
ard, they share a status similar to Bataille’s low prostitute. This is then a status similar to that 
of precarious workers. They are central bearers of a system that abuses and exploits them. 
They fulfill a central function in society, but the system regulating this same society depends 
on their silence and submission.  
The patterns of dominance pertaining to imperialist exploitation and the subjugation of 
women in a patriarchal society share som fundamental features. It is interesting to note that 
Ann Laura Stoler has found similar patterns of subjugation and dependency between native 
women and European men183. It is likely that such patterns of domination and exploitation in 
foreign lands would have consequences on the domestic scene, as well. As Stoler describes it, 
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the native woman fulfills a nurturing role that made it possible for the colonizers to remake 
the colonized world according to their ideas of order and civilization. In order to maintain that 
system and thereby hold on to white and male privilege, discriminatory narratives and projec-
tions are applied, which may lead to hatred and self-loathing. This in turn may lower the bar-
riers to physical violence.  
Empirical findings by Bourgois supports such an interpretation. He informs us that 
men in East Harlem meet the loss of authoritarian power over their families by lashing out 
against women and children184. Old patterns of systemic violence are conducive to physical 
violence when combined with additional pressure. Women accustomed to patriarchal struc-
tures are also deeply committed to the relevant system and can react violently when its codes 
are broken185. Women’s support for patriarchal codes of conduct gives some further credence 
to the idea that systems as such are self-perpetuating by providing their members with frames 
of reference and structures of value needed to make sense of everyday life. Patterns of norma-
lization and internalization of values are apt to influence the way people evaluate themselves 
as well as others, so as I’ve pointed out earlier, changes to traditional social structures will 
probably lead to anxiety even in the case of relatively subordinate groups.  
In addition to fidelity to the system itself, Butler posits a fidelity to one’s own role in 
it, such that, in the case of gender, the taboos relevant to each sex makes it likely for people to 
position themselves according to the situationally constructed ego ideal, and thus perform the 
gender roles they are expected to perform on the basis of the social economy relevant for their 
lives186. If this is true, then not only is gender not destiny, but individuals will be freer to ex-
plore various possible gender roles if there are several gender identities present in their social 
sphere. On the other hand rigid gender norms are likely to work in self-perpetuating patterns 
as deviations from such norms can be construed as a threat not only to social normativity, but 
also to personal identities. Breaking a norm can be considered an attack on valued personhood 
and possibly a threat to socially strategic positions. As we have seen in the case of patriarchal 
structures during new strategic openings for women, a perceived attack on valued identities 
may provoke a violent response. Of course, moving towards more equal societies where more 
people are capable of pursuing ways of living in tune with their liking is to be desired, and 
there is no excuse for violence or victim blaming, but as has been discussed already in the 
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context of Trump’s electoral victory in 2016, there are dangers associated with feelings of 
beleaguered identities, especially when goods of existential value are perceived to be com-
promised.           
According to patriarchal ideology, women make up the necessary basis from which 
men can change the world according to their rational intellect and realize themselves in soc-
iety. The man works both for himself and his extended family, including the wife at home. 
Such a division of labour seems liable to create contempt and a feeling of entitlement in the 
mind of the man and resentment in the mind of the woman, in addition to a lack of self-esteem 
as well as resentment and an anxiousness to «prove oneself» on the part of human beings who 
are unwilling or unable to live according to the prescribed gender roles. This, however, is the 
way things have to be, because it is the way the world works, according to the divine order. 
We recognize here the pastoral power, where the shepherd takes control of the flock for the 
good of all, because God gave him this mission. This is the way the world is constructed, the 
way it will go on for perpetuity, until suddenly at some point in history it is not like that any-
more. This does something to the boundaries between the homogenous and the heterogenous 
realms. A move away from previously established hierarchies may blur those boundaries and 
lead to perceived crisis for all members of the previously accepted system, but probably parti-
cularly for people advantageously positioned.   
The revolutionary idea that women are people changed the field of social relations in 
such a way that the traditional man (pater familias) is no longer the self-explanatory top of the 
pyramid. Still, whose rules apply even in this new society remains a valid question. If women 
partake on an equal footing in a game that was originally written for men, does that necessari-
ly entail that the game has been fundamentally changed? Butler would argue that it has not, 
and I tend to agree with her. As Foucault sees it, the epistemic web ordering the dominant so-
cial discourse is a precondition for not thinking along the same lines. For it to be possible that 
different subjects find themselves in mutually adversarial positions, there has to be a very tig-
htly woven network to regularize historic knowledge187. This may lead to a perception that the 
struggle for equality can only take place along a strictly defined axis that has previously been 
the domain of subjugation and injustice.  
If it is true that discourses and counterdiscourses are positioned along the same line, 
however, it seems likely that struggling for positions within the same framework really just 
 
187 Foucault, Michel: «Society Must Be Defended», p. 208 
changes the positions of the pieces on the board without challenging the rules of the game that 
creates and maintains existing injustices in the first place. On the other hand, improving the 
standing of women in a patriarchal society is of the utmost importance, both for the lives of 
the women involved and for the chances of establishing a social space where the negotiation 
of gender and sexuality is at all possible. There are thus two struggles that must be fought at 
the same time if one wishes a world of equal opportunity. One is centered on a political axis, 
fighting for equality of opportunity within the established framework. The other is centered 
on the ontological and epistemic axis. Using the tools avaiable in the present culture, one must 
constantly question and deconstruct prevailing assumptions about sexuality and gender. Butler 
argues that one must question the underlying rules, one must explore the basic assumptions 
pertaining to gender and sexuality the better to dismantle those of them that are harmful. This 
holds true for racism, as well. We must explore the undercurrents of racist discourse in order 
to challenge it, and hopefully at some point get rid of racism all together. 
 
11. The Contingency of Freedom 
 
If we assume that freedom and autonomy are values worth pursuing, they are also val-
ues worth problematizing. In this section, I will look at two different struggles for freedom, 
the one being Steve Biko’s struggle against white supremacy in South Africa and the other 
being local feminists’ struggle against patriarchy in the MENA region. I shall argue that both 
these struggles demonstrate that freedom is dependent on context and not all sorts of freedom 
are always equal or necessarily even compatible. As Foucault reminded us, we are always sit-
uated in relations of power that shape us as individuals and set the conditions for possible 
strategies within the limits of various dispositifs. What freedoms different people have cause 
to value must be decided by those people themselves and the idea of freedom as something 
that can be given by external agents can too easily function as the basis for a new priesthood 
and thus make the freedom thus granted the foundation of other kinds of dependency and res-
sentiment. In line with Bataille’s dictum that one cannot «be everything» I here want to dem-
onstrate how campaigns for the common good can create or solidify patterns of hatred, resent-
ment and social ostracism unless one respects the logics of local power structures.      
Racism is a social ill, and getting rid of it would benefit society and lead to healthier 
relationship between persons living in a shared community. This was the goal of Steve Biko, 
the political activist and philosopher who was the chief ideologist and leader of the Black 
Consciousness Movement. Biko had been stricken by the attitude of white superiority present 
even in relatively progressive anti-apartheid students. Similar to the experience of Fanon, it 
was taken for granted that the language used at anti-apartheid meetings was to be English and 
there was an attitude among the white activists that they had a duty to represent «the voice of 
the oppressed», thus in practice contributing to the marginalization of the very people they 
were ostensibly trying to save188. We recognize here the role of the priests in Nietzsche’s gen-
ealogy, who take it upon themselves to lead the downtrodden according to the precepts of the 
priestly class. The agency of the people thus led, according to the principle of ressentiment, is 
thereby undermined. As Biko clearly saw, such a liberation movement cannot lead to genuine 
freedom for the people being oppressed, especially if the guiding principle of the struggle for 
liberation takes the form of a reigning morality.  
Theweleit points out that revolution in the name of a «new morality» tends to keep old 
patterns of dominance and subjugation alive such that social hierarchies are maintained in the 
face of shifting power relations189. Foucault concurs, claiming that the philosophy of Ideolo-
gists tends to provide the discursive foundation upon which more overt struggles for political 
power take place. The revolutionaries are then led according to the dictate of hegemonic phil-
osophers190. He was here in agreement with Marx, who was convinced that the emancipation 
of the working class must be the act of the working class itself. In Biko’s case this would im-
ply that black people could not trust «white saviours» to give them freedom. Struggles against 
white supremacy had to be based on the principle of black solidarity.  
In line with this, Biko came to the realization that the removal of apartheid was not 
enough to ensure freedom for black people living under white rule. There also had to be a 
struggle against white supremacy in general, and one of the loci in which this struggle had to 
take place was the minds of black people having internalized the racist system of values that 
served to support and legitimize racist oppression. Along with capitalist exploitation, the colo-
nized subject had to get rid of an oppression of the soul191. In order to do that, different groups 
of people had to get together to fight the common enemy, which was white supremacy192. 
 
188 Cloete, Michael: «STEVE BIKO: black consciousness and the african other – the struggle for the political». In: 
Angelaki, 04 March 2019, Vol.24(2) p. 108 
189 Theweleit, Klaus: Male Fantasies, Volume 1, pp. 366-367 
190 Foucault, Michel: The Will to Knowledge, pp. 140-141 
191 Cloete, Michael: «STEVE BIKO: black consciousness and the african other – the struggle for the political». In: 
Angelaki, 04 March 2019, Vol.24(2), p. 110 
192 Ibid., pp. 112-113 
There is in Biko’s thinking an emphasis on unity in difference. While oppression against the 
Indian, the Xhosas, the Vendi and the Zulu were rooted in the same ideology, there had to be 
a recognition of different experiences beneath that common oppression, as the alternative 
might well be a new form of oppression. There is also a focus on the economic exploitation 
inherent to the apartheid regime, while recognizing that the economic dimension of apartheid 
was not the only dimension of oppression. Neglecting any of these dimensions because of an 
overemphasis on a single issue might undermine the struggle against white supremacy. 
Hence, the struggle for liberation, and against the racist discourse that stands in the 
way of it, must be fought on several different frontiers at the same time. The problem is multi-
faceted, so it must be solved through a multiplicity of strategies. Ignoring one aspect of the 
problem can lead to problems in other areas. This might also serve as a reminder that logics 
come prior to strategies. This lesson is brought home by the anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod 
in her work on the situation of Muslim women, Do Muslim Women Need Saving?  
Abu-Lughod argues that the trope of the Muslim woman being oppressed by Muslim 
religion and culture is largely an Orientalist phantasm made up for the sake of legitimacy of 
intervention by the «international community». Actual Muslim women she has spoken to do 
not recognize the situation described through this trope193. Islam for them is rather a valued 
part of their identity that add meaning to their lives. There are patterns of oppression that in-
fluence these women’s lives, but the way they see it, they are oppressed by their political situ-
ations rather than their shared religion. On the other hand, there are reasons for being sceptical 
to accepting such statements at face value. There are patterns of oppression that seem to be 
particularly salient in Muslim communities, and societies where women are assigned to a do-
mestic role are often based on monotheistic religions, of which Islam is one.  
One should certainly not ignore the fundamental role general culture plays for political 
situations and regimes, but neither should one ignore the testimonies given by the people 
whose lives are impacted by these regimes. Neither is there anything wrong in having feelings 
of solidarity with women suffering under oppressive social practices, but one should generally 
ask for their consent before acting on it. Sacredness is, as we have seen, an ambivalent thing, 
and that is likely to be the case for organized religion, as well. The same institutions that may 
oppress people in some ways may also function in ways that provide them with a sense of 
identity and belonging. At the same time, then, that one should be supportive of challenges to 
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conservative practices, one should be aware that these challenges do not take place in a social 
vacuum. That, I think, is Abu-Lughod’s particular strength as an anthropologist. Trying to 
grant people freedom and empowerment in accordance with norms of societies far away from 
them may well be tantamount to enforcing a Procrustean bed on the people one is trying to 
help, and also a certain kind of epistemic colonialism, which would probably be counterprod-
uctive, if not outright harmful. Abu-Lughod certainly sees the danger inherent to such well 
intended projects.  
The Western rationale behind the discourse of rescue is clarified by Abu-Lughod when 
she explains how the narrative has been focused on «cultural issues», and how, for example, 
the work of local feminists in Bangladesh has been ignored in favour of the exploits of «enlig-
htened saviours» from the West. The stories behind the news, she says, have been radically al-
tered in order to fit into a narrative where agents of civilization save culturally oppressed wo-
men from the claws of authoritarian «savages»194. Implicit in that term is not only the essenti-
al wickedness of these oppressors, but also a potential threat to goodness and civilization. As 
noted, the intention behind the campaign for Muslim liberation may be quite benign, but there 
are other elements pertaining to Western Orientalist discourse that one should pay attention 
to, as well. As Edward Said pointed out in the book Orientalism, Western colonial powers 
have a long history of essentalising the Muslim Other in the Near East as a central strategy in 
their quests for domination. Even though criticism of practices in Muslim countries is often 
legitimate, and even necessary, they can easily be tainted by ingrained discourses. 
The interests of outside powers in the MENA region are certainly not new. Before our 
time, there was the Great Game in Afghanistan and the Sykes-Picot line dividing Syria and 
Iraq. With examples like these in mind, it should not come as a surprise if a campaign for 
liberation from particularly Russia or Western powers might further worsen the position of 
women in these societies. The reactionary regimes we see, for example in Iran, can in part be 
understood as structures of ressentiment. The sometimes legitimate notion that «society must 
be defended» can be conducive to strictly normative societies, and from that to hierarchies of 
human worth and dignity. These earlier campaigns, given the lessons of Fanon, will probably 
make an impact on the minds of imperialist agents, as well. The trope of the Savage Orient, as 
Abu-Lughod describes it, combines the discourse of racism with the discourse of sexism. Mu-
slim women are here presented as victims of a culture ruled by authoritarian men, they are de-
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void of agency and, apparently, not far from the «blank slate» that Locke spoke of. There 
seems to be a view of women as devoid of agency that sexisms in East and West have in com-
mon, and historic trajectories in the West can be of use to feminists in the MENA region. As 
Biko taught us, however, progressive change must happen from below in local societies, using 
the social and cultural tools available to them. 
We have seen that classic sexist mythology posits women as corporal entities and 
guardians of home and hearth. To rescue these women can be construed as saving the pure 
land from the hands of barbarians. It is also a cause that can be used to uphold the racist dis-
course necessary to legitimize military campaigns. I turn again to the great postcolonial theo-
rist Achille Mbembe, who in his book On the Postcolony states that the form of domination 
imposed during colonialism and slave trade in Africa could be understood as phallic. It is bas-
ed on a mobilization of the subjective foundations of masculinity and femininity and it has di-
rect, close contact with the general economy of sexuality195.  
As Edward Said explains, this kind of phallic domination has certainly been present in 
the Near East, as well. Given the strictly regulated sexual life in Europe, the Orient was seen 
as a place one could go to for sexual experiences unobtainable in Europe196. Like the daught-
ers of the working class, Middle Eastern women were seen as training ground the sons of the 
upper class could go to for experience before continuing their bourgois linage with a suitable 
match. Foucault (with support from Bourdieu, as we have seen) suggests that the «deployment 
of sexuality» from the bourgoisie contributed to strict sexual norms in the working class197. It 
would probably not be out of place to assume that such exploitation has made an impact on 
gender relations in some of the countries where colonial powers have been at work, such that 
the prevailing economy of gender is connected to a distrust of foreigners, for much the same 
reasons that sexism and racism are operative in our own cultural sphere, only magnified beca-
use of the wounds of imperial violence. This may further help explain why some Muslim wo-
men choose to wear this garb in spite of their families’ wishes. For them, it may be a proud 
expression of loyalty to their nation and independence from foreign domination. As we have 
seen, feelings of beleaguered identities, which colonialism has a tendency to produce, may al-
so help explain why one would choose to follow leaders like Osama bin Laden.  
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There seem to be two factors relevant to the struggles of the Muslim feminist, which 
she fundamentally has in common with feminists in the West, but with somewhat different 
challenges because of cultural and historic contingencies. One of these factors is improving 
the situation of women in the area where she lives. The other is to negotiate within the system 
of values and social strategies proper to her culture and social sphere, that is to define the par-
ameters of feminism according to her own life. That is certainly not to say that any divergence 
from orthodox Islam is to be considered a concession to Western imperialism, but any project 
for Muslim liberation is probably destined to fail if it ignores the sensemaking features of peo-
ple’s social lives. There are practices and traditions proper to some Muslim communities, 
such as female genital mutilation, that we should condemn and try to change, but in order to 
be effective that must be done in cooperation with local opponents to such practices. 
As Foucault has pointed out, power is not best construed as something that one does or 
does not have, but rather as a field of relations within which various individuals are different-
ly situated. It is more constructive to see power in terms of relations between people than as a 
tangible good. Perhaps something similar could be said about freedom. Freedom should then 
not be understood primarily as a basic resource, but rather as a mechanism that regulates rela-
tions between people. If that is the case, then emphasizing local traditions and customs in the 
meetings between people of differet cultures becomes even more important, as breaches with 
culturally accepted ideas of freedom may be conducive to the establishment of stereotypes 
that tend to present a distorted conception of the culturally Other. These stereotypes may furt-
her erode trust between men and women in societies which are already fraught with strict gen-
der divisions, especially given reciprocal dynamics of fear and distrust where «their savages» 
come to hate «our heathens» and the heathens justify wars in the lands of savages through the-
ir mission to save women from their cultures. The same dynamics may lead to general distrust 
between people of different cultures within the same polity. 
If failures of cultural interpretation make us see Muslims in foreign countries as savag-
es and as a threat to civilization, then that will have an impact on The Muslim as stereotype. 
All of us have prejudices of various sorts, which is probably necessary given our limited cog-
nitive horizons as well as our culturally constituted personalities. Hence, we are all liable to 
see our ways of living as the «right» one, that should be universally accepted. A person chal-
lenging such conceptions of proper behaviour may therefore risk being treated unfairly by a 
majority or by a hegemonic group. The trope of «Muslim as Barbarian» may be conflated 
with the «Muslim as dangerous individual», thus contributing to the stereotype «Muslim as 
carrier of disease», given the narrative about the dangerous individual present in Foucault’s 
Abnormal. The resulting ostracism and irrational hostility on the part of society at large may 
in turn increase the risk of isolation and resentment, possibly leading to actual recruitment to 
fringe groups reacting violently to the systemic violence perpetrated against them.  
 
12. Conclusion: «Why Can’t We All Just Get Along?» 
 
Armed with the theoretical tools acquired through working on this thesis, I return to 
Kadyrov’s dungeons in Chechnya. I will use the conclusion of this case study as a conduit for 
the theoretical lessons I have drawn through working on this thesis. My concluding thoughts 
on Chechnya will be my concluding thoughts in this thesis on the social dynamics of hatred 
and exclusion. Why is it that persons suspected of not being heterosexual are considered such 
a threat to the North Caucasian republic that torture chambers have been prepared for them? 
One very important factor is the history of the republic. 
The Northern Caucasus, including Chechnya, was an object of Russian imperial ambi-
tions since the 18th century, and has been a rather unstable region since it was brought in und-
er Russian rule. When Yeltsin famously said that the Russian republics «could take as much 
power as they can swallow», Chechnya followed suit and bid for independence, only to be 
crushed by Russia’s military might. There is therefore reason to expect a certain siege mental-
ity in the republic’s political culture. An experience that one is under siege has a tendency to 
make people look for real or imagined enemies, such as «elite cultural feminists» and «post-
modern neo-marxists». In a region such as the northern Caucasus, where military campaigns 
could not but make an impact on the political culture in the region, a tendency of machismo 
and militarism is to be expected.  
Given its history, it is understandable that there are currents of political paranoia in the 
Chechen republic. Kadyrov has cultivated a political image as a tough guy since he took over 
for his father, whom he previously served as a body guard. He is a person whom people can 
and must follow in order to build a strong nation, particularly in its relations with greater Rus-
sia. There is therefore ground for a cult of personality, where Kadyrov’s enemies become the 
nation’s enemies. Because of old metaphysical and political ideas pertaining to gender, homo-
sexuality may be considered a threat to the virility, and hence the readiness for combat, of the 
general population. Societies marked by troubled relations with stronger significant others are 
more likely to be vulnerable to homophobia because of prevailing gendered notions of activity 
and passivity. Kadyrov has, time and again, added to the relevant stigma by saying that «there 
are no such people in our republic». If we take his words literally, this seems to suggest that 
any gay person in Chechnya is not a part of the polity, and is therefore dispensable. He has 
defined Chechnya’s LGBT people as homines sacri, outcasts who can be killed («hunted») 
with impunity. As we have seen, however, it would be overly simple to pin the entire respons-
ibility for the situation on the President, who is a subject formed in and by power as every-
body else. Chechnya’s LGBT have been stigmatized by the Chechen community and Kadyrov 
is riding a bloody wave of hatred in order to keep his position in society. 
Along with the renunciation of gay Chechens, there will probably also be a fear of so-
cial contagion. As we have seen, part of the fear of people standing outside what is counted as 
civil society stems from a fear that their presence can have a contagious effect on people in 
the proximity of the stigmatized person. There will therefore be a perceived need to get rid of, 
or even «cleanse», people who are marked by a social taboo. This may help explain why asso-
ciating stigmatized people with rodents and vermin has had such an accelerating effect on 
processes of exclusion and violent persecution. This kind of manifactured association was a 
prominent part of anti-semitic propaganda by the Nazis and the propaganda against Tutsi 
Rwandese by Hutu militants before the genocide in 1994. Interpreting these horrible cases of 
violence and destruction as simply a result of the evil natures of their perpetrators is not an 
acceptable attitude to history and is not fair to the victims of these atrocities. Refusing to 
acknowledge the general lessons we can draw from these tragedies makes us more liable to 
repeat them. Rather, I think they should be seen as extreme instances of dangers inherent to 
community building, which has a tendency to create zones of inclusion and exclusion.  
Naturalization of social structures can entail a sort of «denaturalization» of alternativ-
es, defining them as what Freud called the «unheimlich», which in turn may associate the 
stranger with the notion of monstrosity. Individuals who deviate from the norm may be assoc-
iated with disorder and dirt, as we know from Douglas, and ultimately with chaos and death, 
which characterizes the Outside of civilization. We have then an imaginary link between soc-
ial deviance, physical degeneracy and possible contamination, which can yield violent results. 
This is a phenomenon that is particularly salient in the dynamics of racism, which again se-
ems to indicate a link between homophobia and racism, as well as a paranoid obsession with 
holding on to «our women», «lest the Negroes get to them and contaminate the race».  
Societies are guided by norms that give us ideas about «good» and «evil», or «good» 
and «bad», which are never innocent concepts, but rather coordinates defined by the field of 
power that regulates a given society. In this society, norms and values become naturalized in 
individuals through processes of habituation and normalization. This happens through various 
dispositifs deployed through institutions such as schools, armies and workshops. Along with 
the normalization of individuals, we have a perpetuation of social structures that have practic-
al consequences for the members of any given community. The governing ideas in society 
have normalizing power over individuals through the workings of administrative dispositifs. 
The inherent logic of any society necessarily leaves something out. Societies create 
their own outcasts, and are indeed largely defined by them. That means that there will in all 
likelihood be groups of people against whom people will have negative prejudices. These tend 
to be individuals of low status, often exploited individuals, as we have seen in the case of im-
perialism. This is an unfortunate side effect of binding normativity, and should be a reminder 
that we always need to negotiate and redefine the norms and values that guide us in our every-
day lives. The norms proper to an individual has much to do with the role he or she has in 
which communities, or what role people themself expects to fulfill in these communities. The 
aspects of one’s identity that are valued seem to be the aspects that bring positive sense to 
one’s place in one’s community. They are phenomena that bring meaning and value to one’s 
sense of community. For example, a white anti-racist will hate anti-black racism even if this is 
a phenomenon that is obviously not targeted against said anti-racist.  
The ideas that prevail in various communities are also important for moral decisions. 
If one is convinced that something or someone is harmful to community and civilization, then 
one is more likely to hate that thing or person. Other external factors are also decisive, hence 
the central importance of the dispositif. Various stressors can contribute to various forms of 
hatred and aggression. People who find themselves powerless or on the bottom of the social 
hierarchy are apparently more likely to lash out because of unresolved hatreds than people 
higher up in the pecking order. Given a pecking order, one is likely to want to keep one’s 
place in the hierarchy rather than move further down.  
If there is one take-home message to get out of this thesis, it will probably be a remin-
der of what the Nigerian feminist writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie called «the danger of a 
single story». If a reader, having gone through these pages has gotten the impression that I am 
opposed to norms and civilization, that is quite understandable. The thesis has been written to 
warn against the dangers inherent to those concepts, that are often associated with something 
good that we need to function together as persons. They are that as well. Without any kinds of 
norms or any kind of civilization it would certainly be difficult to find meaning in the world, 
or to function together as people, but one should not be blind to the potential violence present 
in discources that promise perfect Truth, Goodness, Democracy, or any other perfect ideals. 
Such discourses have a tendency to close out other truths and kinds of civilizations, and to 
suffocate alternatives. A person who in some way breaks the codes of conduct pertaining to a 
dominant project can often be in danger of ostracism or persecution. The hatreds arising from 
such processes can be of many kinds, depending on the interplay of social forces. That, how-
ever, is not to say that the codes of conduct should not be there, but they should normally be 
open to negotiation.  
Any predominating discourse has a potential to turn violent. If it stifles and suffocates 
relevant counterdiscourses, then that will be dangerous for people who do not fit into the pre-
valent order. This is a danger on the left as well as the right, as several authoritarian polities 
have served to demonstrate. Since the late 1970s/ early 1980s, the predominant discourse in 
the West, and probably the world, is that of neo-liberalism. Structures inherent to this disco-
urse are likely to keep old hatreds intact, or perhaps strengthen them, because they tend to 
undermine and devalue the kinds of solidarity necessary to sympathize with people on the 
same rung as oneself or lower down. The tenets of neo-liberalism tend to induce the idea that 
destitute people are merely «lacking in grit» and turn one’s focus away from actual oppressive 
structures at the same time that it produces its own outcasts, as the «criminal pauper» demon-
strates.  
In the face of any dominant discourse, it is necessary to develop counterdiscourses and 
to maintain a degree of heterogeneity in the face of homogenous social order. Such counter-
discourses can be constructive or destructive, as Foucault and Bataille have pointed out by 
emphasizing the difference between revolutionary and fascist discourse. The latter is, as we 
have seen, often a result of resentment to the prevalent master discourse. One cannot simply 
disregard the reigning homogenous order, but as Butler and Mbembe have pointed out, it is 
possible to work on the semiotic structure of the dominant discourse and reconfigure it in ord-
er to challenge its basic presumptions. In the face of neo-liberalism, individual measures will 
not be sufficient, counterstructures of solidarity must be established. A reawakening of class 
consciousness could be helpful here, such that classes that are currently «in themselves» can 
become classes «for themselves». A critical form of Marxism may be quite useful, while a 
vulgar form of anti-capitalism might just move the pawns without changing the rules of the 
game. As the idea of the perfect society is dangerous, so is the idea of the perfect individual. 
One should take Bataille’s lessons to heart and remember that we are mortal, final and fallible 
creatures, and that we cannot «be everything». Ultimately, people need other people in order 
to get help where they fall short, and in order to make sense of the world. Emphasizing the 
values of community and solidarity may finally lead to the death of homo oeconomicus so that 
homo solidaricus may live.      
If «the soul is the prison of the body», then at least it is a prison capable of constant 
modification. It is important to point that out, because these days there seems to be a tendency 
in the ideology of Rationality, which poses a danger similar to that of neo-liberalism. This id-
eology is not really new, but is rather a sort of rehash of old Greek prejudices that have led to 
misogyny and cultural chauvinism in the past. Nietzsche saw that quite clearly and left behind 
warnings that are available for all who bother to read them. If we allow ourselves to believe 
that instrumental rationality can lead us toward some final goal of Freedom and Happiness, 
we are likely to forget that the discourse of science is not some objective haven free from ide-
ology, as I have demonstrated several times during the course of this thesis. Normativity is 
always with us, and must constantly be scrutinized. Blind faith in objective Truths can lead to 
irrational hatreds.   
Research on the mechanisms of stigmatization and exclusion highlights the need for 
more or less neutral arenas where people of different opinions and persuasions can come to-
gether and try their opinions. For communities to be inclusive, people must be able to meet in 
the knowledge that clearly defined rules will defend them from the tyranny of opinion and 
prejudice. Such negotiable rules may also help us avoid a scenario where these same arenas 
become testing grounds for powerful demagogues. There is, then, a need for norms, while one 
should also be aware of their dangers. The pursuit of good ends makes us liable to overlook 
specificities of communities and situations, as I tried to demonstrate through the critique of 
feminism in the MENA region. The prospects of a sufficiently neutral arena will improve sub-
stantially with the establishment of venues where people can meet to negotiate norms and val-
ues, particularly paying attention to voices from minority groups.  
Finally, societies should beware of their potential sources of paranoia. In the words of 
Danny Vinyard in American History X: «Life’s too short to be pissed off all the time.»          
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